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I. INTRODUCTION
When an East German citizen hijacked a Polish airliner and di-
verted it to the United States Air Base in West Berlin on a sum-
mer day in 1978, he set off a series of complicated diplomatic ma-
neuvers that months later resulted in his criminal trial in an
American court in Berlin. Convened as a court authorized by arti-
cle II of the Constitution, the United States Court for Berlin was
presided over by an American judge appointed by the United
States Ambassador to West Germany. Teams of American prosecu-
tors and American defense lawyers flew into Berlin to handle the
proceedings. Months later, in May 1979, the court convicted Detlef
Tiede, the East German accused of air piracy, of taking a hostage
but acquitted him of all other counts. The judge sentenced him to
time served-nine months.
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Although all the participants viewed this American trial overseas
of a civilian accused of committing a crime outside the territory of
the United States as a total anomaly, current events suggest that
similar scenarios may develop in the future. For example, the June
1985 hijacking of an American airplane to Beirut, Lebanon in-
volved a number of criminal acts that the United States would like
to see punished. As did Tiede in 1978, the 1985 hijackers diverted
a commercial airliner. They held a number of American civilians
hostage for seventeen days, and killed an American sailor. After
the hostages were released, President Reagan publicly demanded
that the Lebanese either try the hijackers or deliver them to the
Americans for trial. In addition, to encourage their apprehension,
he offered a reward for information leading to the arrest and con-
viction of the hijackers.
More recently, in October 1985, hijackers seized an Italian cruise
ship and executed an American passenger. After the hostages were
released, American military planes intercepted the plane carrying
the hijackers and forced it to land in Italy. President Reagan again
demanded the delivery of the hijackers to the Americans for trial.
Hijackings are a phenomenon that the United States will con-
tinue to face, and they may trigger, in the future, the convening of
American courts overseas. Using the American decision to try a hi-
jacker in Berlin in 1978 as precedent, the President of the United
States may, in an effort to deter terrorist activity directed at
American citizens and American property located beyond the bor-
ders of the United States, assign criminal trials of hijackers to an
overseas American court.
Whether an American court convenes to deal with hijackers in
Berlin, Beirut, Italy, or anywhere else beyond the borders of the
United States, a fundamental question is raised: does the United
States Constitution permit the criminal trial of a civilian in a fed-
eral court overseas that lacks the safeguards of judicial indepen-
dence required by article III? This Article examines that question.
The Article reviews the policies underlying the constitutional re-
quirement that the judicial power of the United States be confined
to article III federal courts and investigates the historical evidence
concerning federal criminal trials that have been permitted to pro-
ceed in non-article III tribunals. It recounts the circumstances that
led the United States to hold a criminal trial in Berlin in 1979 in a
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federal court constituted under article II of the United States Con-
stitution and describes the legal justifications advanced for the
constitutionality of the American court in Berlin. After examining
the two plausible bases for permitting the President to convene an
article II court to try hijacking cases overseas-the Executive's war
power and foreign relations power-this Article concludes that
these powers do not justify the evasion of article III safeguards.
The criminal proceeding in the United States Court for Berlin vio-
lated the Constitution. Similarly, trials of hijackers in executive
branch courts in Beirut or Italy would violate the Constitution.
When the United States chooses to prosecute a civilian hijacker in
an American court, the Constitution requires that the government
proceed in an article III court.
II. FEDERAL COURTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
The Constitution of the United States divides the national gov-
ernment into three branches and provides for the powers and limi-
tations of each branch. Article I of the Constitution enumerates
the legislative powers assigned to Congress; article II catalogues
the executive powers assigned to the President; article III requires
that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."' The framers of the Constitu-
tion compartmentalized the federal government in this manner be-
cause they believed that tyranny would result if one group con-
trolled the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of
government.2 Fearing that compartmentalization itself might fail
to protect adequately one branch against encroachment by the
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cI. 1.
2. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than that ... [t]he accumula-
tion of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elec-
tive, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300-08 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Indeed, the accepted
political theory in the United States in the late eighteenth century was that government
should be compartmentalized in order to avoid an unhealthy concentration of power. See
Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers", 2 U. CHI. L. REv.
385, 394-419 (1935). At the time of the federal constitutional convention, a majority of state
constitutions required compartmentalized governments. Id. at 419.
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other branches, the framers drafted additional safeguards. In order
to guarantee that the judicial branch remained independent of the
political branches, article III provides that judges of the judicial
branch shall be guaranteed life tenures and protection against re-
duction in salary.4 The framers intended that this judicial indepen-
dence achieve three goals: to prevent the other branches from ef-
fectively engaging in adjudication by influencing the judges'
decisions,5 to enable the judiciary to check the unconstitutional
acts that the other branches might take,6 and to guarantee that the
litigants receive impartial adjudication.7 These goals remain funda-
mental to our system of government. Because judicial indepen-
dence furthers these goals, exceptions to article III's judicial inde-
pendence requirements meet with strong disfavor. Nonetheless,
some exceptions do exist.
Certain federal "courts" have been established in which judges
lack life tenure and salary protection. As catalogued recently in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,8
these exceptions "reduce to three narrow situations." Territorial
courts, military courts, and courts or agencies that adjudicate
"public rights" 10 exist as exceptions to article III justified by "cir-
cumstance[s] in which the grant of power to the Legislative and
Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so excep-
tional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legisla-
tive courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the
3. Article III provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold
their offices during good Behavior .... U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
4. Article III provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, .. shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office." Id.
5. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-27 (1978); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 47, supra note 2, at 303-08; THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-72 (A. Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter, ed. 1961).
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-13 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Sharp,
supra note 2, at 422-34. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), made explicit
the power of the judicial branch to restrain actions of the other branches.
7. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
8. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
9. Id. at 64.
10. Id. at 64-67. For a full discussion of the needs giving rise to these exceptions, see infra
text accompanying notes 212-25.
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constitutional mandate of separation of powers."11 Emphasizing
the limited nature of these exceptions, the Marathon plurality
adopted a restrictive view of the circumstances in which non-arti-
cle III federal courts are permissible.12
The opinion in Marathon did not define the outer limits of the
judicial power of the United States that the Constitution vests in
the federal judiciary. It did identify, however, certain matters that
federal courts lacking the constitutionally prescribed safeguards of
judicial independence may not consider: "all private adjudications
in federal courts within the States and all criminal matters with
the narrow exception of military crimes. There is no doubt that
when the Framers assigned the 'judicial power' to an independent
Article III branch, these matters lay at what they perceived to be
the protected core of that power."13
III. THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR BERLIN
A. The Hijacking and the Trial
Undoubtedly, no one on the Polish commercial airliner headed
for East Berlin on August 30, 1978, pondered the Supreme Court's
view of judicial independence and separation of powers. Shortly
before the airplane reached its destination, a hijacker walked into
the cockpit, gun in hand, and convinced the pilot to fly to West
Berlin. 14 The pilot made an emergency landing at the United
11. Id. at 64. Although the opinion emphasized legislative courts created by Congress pur-
suant to article I, the same analysis and policy considerations apply to courts created by the
President in exercise of his article II powers. Indeed, American military courts, which clearly
are not part of the independent federal judiciary mandated by article III, in some instances
have been established by legislation and in other instances have been created solely by pres-
idential order. See infra text accompanying notes 60-73.
12. [O]ur Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that
the "judicial power of the United States" must be reposed in an independent
Judiciary. It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously
guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence.
Id. at 60.
13. Id. at 70 n.25 (emphasis added).
14. See generally STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984) (recounting the facts about the hi-
jacking itself and about the eventual trial). The author, Herbert J. Stern, is a member of the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. He served as one of the three
judges assigned to the United States Court for Berlin to handle the hijacking case. See infra
notes 22, 26.
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States Air Base at Tempelhof Airport.15 Hans Detlef Tiede, the hi-
jacker, Ingrid Ruske, the woman who accompanied him, and Sab-
ine Ruske, Ingrid's twelve-year-old daughter, walked off the Polish
airliner and into a diplomatic imbroglio. Because they landed at a
United States Air Base, American officials took these three East
German citizens into custody, but the Americans expected the
West German authorities to handle the case.
An international treaty, to which West Germany, East Germany,
Poland, and the United States are signatories, requires each coun-
try either to prosecute or to extradite hijackers.16 A more recent
15. Tempelhof Airport, built by Hitler in 1936, is located in the United States sector of
West Berlin. It served civilian air traffic in the post-World War II era until Tegel Airport,
located in the French sector, was built. By 1978 Tempelhof had become an American Air
Force base serving only American military air traffic. Stern, supra note 14, at 3.
16. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (the Hague Convention) provides:
The contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever
and whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
At the time of the hijacking to Berlin in 1978, 78 countries had ratified the Hague Conven-
tion, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Re-
public, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany had signed
with the express understanding that the Convention applied to Berlin. 1977-78 TREATIES IN
FoRCE 275.
In addition to the Hague Convention, the international community has joined in several
other treaties to ensure that countries may deal with instances of air piracy and other of-
fenses on board aircraft in flight in a uniform and effective manner. The Convention of
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 20
U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, (the Tokyo Convention) (in force Dec. 4,
1969), covers criminal offenses, acts that endanger safety of aircraft, persons, property on
board, acts that jeopardize good order and discipline on board the aircraft, and hijacking of
aircraft. It has limited jurisdictional provisions, no mandatory prosecution provisions, and
no provisions for extradition or penalties.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970 (the Hague
Convention) concerns itself solely with the offense of hijacking, which it defines in article 1.
Its jurisdictional provisions are more expansive than those of the Tokyo Convention. As
mentioned above, the Hague Convention requires the country with custody of the offender
either to extradite the hijacker to the country of registration of the aircraft, or to institute
proceedings for the purpose of prosecution. The convention contains various measures to
facilitate extradition proceedings and calls for the imposition of severe penalties.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion,done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (the Montreal Convention), fills in
the gaps left by the Tokyo and Hague Conventions. Whereas the earlier conventions applied
only to offenses committed by persons on board the aircraft, the Montreal Convention does
not require that the offender be on board, but merely that the offense be against an aircraft
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international declaration calls for the suspension of air traffic to
countries that provide sanctuary to hijackers.17 Faced with Tiede's
hijacking, the West Germans wanted to comply with the air piracy
treaty. They wanted no part, however, of prosecuting East
Germans who, according to the West German Constitution, have a
right to enter and reside in West Germany. 8 Extraditing Tiede
and the Ruskes to East Germany was out of the question. The
West Germans therefore pressured the United States to handle the
case.
1 9
After a month of diplomatic lobbying and consultation, the
United States Department of State made a decision that it must
now regret. Relying on an ordinance promulgated by the United
States High Commissioner for Germany in 195520 and never before
utilized, the United States agreed to convene, at West German ex-
pense, an American court in West Berlin. Thus, the United States
Court for Berlin sprang to life. Tiede and Ruske would be prose-
in flight or in service. Provisions on jurisdiction, extradition, and penalties are the same as
those set out in the Hague Convention.
The three conventions only pertain to flights in which the place of take-off or the place of
actual landing is outside the territory of the country of registration of the aircraft. The
conventions do not apply to military, police, or customs services.
17. In 1978 in a declaration issued at a meeting in Bonn in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Japan and seven Western countries stated that they would cease flights to and from
any country that refuses to prosecute or extradite air hijackers. 78 Department of State
Bulletin No. 201B, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1308 (July 17, 1878).
18. "All Germans shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the federal territory."
Grundgesetz [GG] art 11, § 2; see also id., art 16, § 2 ("Persons persecuted on political
grounds shall enjoy the right to asylum.").
19. See Stern, supra note 14, at 27-28.
The United States would prosecute the case. For the first time in nearly thirty
years an occupation court could be convened in Berlin. Why? To save the
Germans the embarrassment of having to prosecute two fugitives whom their
constitution gave the right to defect-a highly unpopular prosecution in Ger-
many, that is, West Germany.
Id. at 31.
20. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY, Law No. 46, Apr.
28, 1955, reprinted in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 237 (1979). This ordinance
establishes a United States Court for Berlin composed of one or more United States Judges
for Berlin appointed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission in Germany. Arti-
cle 3 of Law No. 46 grants this court "original jurisdiction to hear and decide any criminal
case arising under any legislation in effect in the United States Sector of Berlin if the of-
fense was committed within the area of Greater Berlin." Article 6 grants this court jurisdic-
tion in certain civil cases that can be removed, transferred, or referred from a German court.
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cuted under the German Penal Code2 1 but in an American court
following American trial procedure.22 Two Americans, assisted by
two Germans, would prosecute the case,2' and a German lawyer
and two American defense counsel would represent each
defendant.24
Into this setting came Herbert Stern, a federal district judge
from New Jersey.25 At the request of a friend in the Justice De-
partment, Stern accepted the temporary assignment in Berlin. 6
The United States Ambassador to West Germany officially ap-
21. The formal information alleging that Tiede had violated German law contained five
counts: air piracy, taking a hostage, depriving persons of their liberty, assault, and unlawful
possession of a firearm. Stern, supra note 14, at 59.
22. Article 3 of Law No. 46, supra note 20, grants the United States Court for Berlin
power "to establish consistently with applicable legislation rules of practice and proceed-
ings." Judge Dudley D. Bonsai, Senior United States District Judge of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, was appointed in November 1978 as
the first judge of the United States Court for Berlin. On November 30, Judge Bonsai
promulgated Rules of Criminal Procedure for the court. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D.
227, 229 (1979). The rules were similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure promul-
gated by the United States Supreme Court to guide criminal proceedings in American fed-
eral courts. Id. at 238.
23. Andre M. Surena and Roger M. Adelman served as the American prosecutors. Surena,
who at the time of the hijacking was serving as Legal Adviser to the United States Mission
in Berlin, served as United States Attorney for Berlin for purposes of the Tiede-Ruske pros-
ecution. Adelman, an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, acted
as Special Prosecutor for Berlin for purposes of the Tiede-Ruske proceedings. Stern, supra
note 14, at 46.
Marianne Fischer, Regierungsdirektorin, Office of the Senator of Justice, Berlin, and
Gisela Wolf, Oberstaatsanwaltin, Berlin, were the German prosecutors who assisted the
American prosecutors. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 227 (1979).
24. Dietrich Hermann, a member of the Berlin Bar, represented Detlef Tiede. Ulrich E.
Biel, also a member of the Berlin Bar, represented Ingrid Ruske. Id.
In addition, Herbert J. Stern, the third person designated to serve as judge of the United
States Court for Berlin, appointed Judali Best, a criminal lawyer in Washington, D.C., best
known for his representation of Spiro Agnew, and Kenneth L. Adams, a lawyer in Best's
firm, to represent Detlef Tiede. Stern appointed Bernard Hellring, a member of the New
Jersey Bar, and Richard D. Shapiro, one of Helring's partners, to represent Ingrid Ruske.
Stern, supra note 14, at 64. Later Stern appointed an American lawyer, Jesse Climenko, to
represent Ruske's daughter, Sabine. Id. at 192.
25. President Nixon appointed Herbert J. Stern to the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey in 1973. ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: PROFILES OF ALL
ACTivE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 15 (Supp. 1984).
26. Bruno A. Ristau, Director of the Office of Foreign Litigation, United States Depart-
ment of Justice, telephoned Stern in December 1978 to ask him to serve on the United
States Court for Berlin. After discussions between Stern and Mark B. Feldman, Assistant
Legal Adviser of the State Department, and written approval by Warren Burger, Chief Jus-
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pointed him judge of the American occupation court in Berlin. 7 In
accepting this job, Stern became temporarily an employee of the
executive branch of the United States government.2
Stern soon saw that the trial in Berlin involved complicated legal
issues. He learned the outlines of the defendants' stories and be-
came sympathetic to their plight. As pretrial proceedings
tice of the United States, Stern accepted the assignment. Ristau agreed to serve as Clerk of
the United States Court for Berlin. Stern, supra note 14, at 51-55.
Stern was actually the third person appointed to the United States Court for Berlin.
Judge Bonsal served for a short time. See supra note 22. Shortly after promulgating the
rules for the court in Berlin, Judge Bonsai resigned. Stern, supra note 14, at 47-48. Leo M.
Goodman, who was simultaneously serving as Judge of the United States Court of the Allied
High Commission for Germany, temporarily succeeded Judge Bonsal as United States Judge
for Berlin. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 229. After one month, Judge Goodman was
succeeded by Judge Stern. Id.
27. Article 2 of Law No. 46, supra note 20, provides that the judges of the United States
Court for Berlin "shall be appointed by the 'Chief of Mission', who may terminate such
appointment at any time. As used in this law the term 'Chief of Mission' means . . . the
chief of the United States diplomatic mission in Germany." Acting pursuant to this provi-
sion, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany,
appointed Stern judge of the United States Court for Berlin in January 1979. Stern, supra
note 14, at 356. Commenting about his appointment as judge, Stern said: "Actually, of
course, the judge had been selected by the State Department in Washington and the ambas-
sador had made the appointment because he had received instructions to do so." Id.
28. The Eleventh Circuit recently examined the propriety, or indeed constitutionality, of
an article III judge performing executive branch assignments in In re Application of the
President's Commission on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985). The court
found that the appointment of article III federal judges (retired Supreme Court Justice Pot-
ter Stewart and Judge Irving Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit) to an executive branch commission (the President's Commission on Organized
Crime) violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 1198. This ruling casts some
doubt on the validity of Stern's appointment in Berlin because Stern's assignment in Berlin
was clearly an executive branch matter. He served at the pleasure of the United States
Ambassador. Thus, under the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning, the appointment of Stern, a
member of the judicial branch, to an executive branch assignment, may have violated the
separation of powers doctrine.
In contrast to the facts of the Eleventh Circuit case, however, Stem's executive branch
assignment required an article III judge to exercise judicial rather than executive or legisla-
tive functions. Although Stern did not exercise article III power as United States Judge for
Berlin-indeed, Stern's predecessor as United States Judge for Berlin had never served as
an article III judge-his assignment in Berlin called on him to carry out the traditional
judicial tasks of deciding questions of law and presiding over a trial. Despite the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling, therefore, the situation involving Stern and his assignment to Berlin may be
sufficiently distinct that the separation of powers doctrine is not threatened.
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progressed, Stern bridled at the American prosecution team and
ruled in favor of the defendants on a number of issues.2"
The atmosphere surrounding the case became increasingly
politicized. The West German government wanted the matter to
disappear. The American government, nervous about the hijacking
29. Stern ruled that under the United States Constitution the defendants were entitled to
a trial by jury. Stern, supra note 14, at 128. Based on the fifth amendment, he also granted
the defendants' motion to suppress the incriminating statements made by Ingrid Ruske to
the government's chief investigator. Id. at 212. As a result of the suppression of evidence,
the government was forced to drop its case against Ruske.
After the indictment was dismissed, Stem appointed Hellring and Shapiro, Ruske's de-
fense attorneys, as co-counsel with Best and Adams for Tiede, who had been Ruske's co-
defendant. Stern, supra note 14, at 227.
Stern's more surprising ruling was his conclusion that the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution guaranteed the defendants a trial by a jury of West German citizens. He
announced that he would dismiss the case if the government did not provide a jury trial in
Berlin. Stern took this action despite the fact that juries have never played a role in the
German legal system, an inquisitorial system in which typically a panel of judges takes the
lead in identifying issues and questioning witnesses, and despite the fact that German citi-
zens consequently have no obligation to report for jury duty. When the government decided
to proceed, Stern ordered 500 Berliners to report to the newly constructed courtroom on the
American air base in Berlin for jury duty, an order later criticized by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176
(1981) (Stern "ordered that 500 unsuspecting Berliners be rounded up to make a venire for
the trial. .. ").
In Stem's opinion granting the defense motions for a jury trial, United States v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227 (1979), he recognized that juries do not decide criminal trials in American mili-
tary courts and that juries have played no role in consular and occupation court trials of
American civilians overseas. Stern concluded, however, that recent court decisions extending
the right to trial by jury to individuals tried in state courts in the United States and to
American civilians prosecuted for capital crimes by military authorities undermined the tra-
dition of non-jury trials overseas. Stern's reliance on inapposite precedent concerning trials
occuring within the United States where the jury system is firmly established makes his
constitutional ruling questionable at best.
In making this ruling, Stern also ignored the statutory requirements that jurors for fed-
eral trial courts must speak English and be United States citizens, 28 U.S.C. § 1865, re-
quirements that apply to article III courts within the United States and to non-article III
courts beyond the borders of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f).
Once he had concluded that the right to a jury trial did attach to Tiede and Ruske, Stern
did not seriously consider the possibility that the United States Court for Berlin, which, like
all the American military occupation courts in Germany that preceded it, had not been
granted the power to conduct jury trials, lacked the competence to try the case against
Tiede and Ruske. Rather, Stern simply ordered that the rules of the court be amended to
provide for trial by jury.
Although Stern's ruling that the United States Constitution entitled Tiede and Ruske to a
trial by a jury of West German citizens and his subsequent summoning of a jury of Berliners
are highly debatable, the issues raised by these actions are beyond the scope of this Article.
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of American planes, wanted other countries to have no excuse in
the future for refusing to prosecute hijackers. International reper-
cussions were easy to imagine. Indeed, they were vivid to Stern:
"How would the State Department explain to the Poles whose
plane was diverted, to the East Germans whose citizens were pas-
sengers, and to the Russians who were closely monitoring the pro-
ceedings, the dismissal of a case against a self-confessed airplane
hijacker?",30
In Stern's view, foreign policy concerns dominated the trial
strategy of the government attorneys who prosecuted the case.
With the State Department calling the shots, Stern believed that
crucial decisions about prosecution strategy-whether to challenge
the applicability of the United States Constitution in Berlin, the
suppression of Ruske's statements, or the right of Tiede to a jury
trial-were made solely to protect diplomatic interests.31 Stern felt
pressured to provide "a quick nonjury trial, followed by a moder-
ate sentence, substantial enough to satisfy the Russians-but not
unduly harsh. '3 2 The location of the trial and its timing contrib-
uted to the political aura Stern thought surrounded the trial. The
courtroom for the United States Court for Berlin was erected on
the American air base in a portion of the Tempelhof terminal
where American airplanes once landed around the clock in an ef-
fort to sustain the citizens of Berlin during the Soviet blockade of
their city. The weekend before the trial began Tempelhof hosted
the thirtieth anniversary celebration of the Berlin airlift. Five hun-
dred thousand Berliners visited Tempelhof that weekend to honor
the United States airmen, and those of England and France, who
provided the lifeline between Berlin and the rest of the western
30. Stern, supra note 14, at 57.
31. In a sense they [the prosecutors] would face their own choice of evils. They
could, of course, admit to violations of Ingrid Ruske's rights, and accept the
suppression of her statements. But that would be bad for foreign policy. So
instead, they would defend what had been done. They could accord Detlef
Tiede the same rights he would have received in any American court-but
that, too, was perceived as bad for the country. So in Berlin-a historic place
for such a choice-the State Department took the other course. To protect
important interests, it chose the lesser evil.
Stern, supra note 14, at 60.
32. Id. at 59.
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world.33 This pro-American outpouring, Stern worried, would
strengthen the government's hand in its rush to convict Tiede.34
According to Stern, the State Department's eagerness to control
the trial for diplomatic purposes led to some subtle and not-so-
subtle encounters. Stern was treated to box seats at the Berlin
Philharmonic and invited to dinner at the United States Ambassa-
dor's residence.3 5 Over dinner the conversation turned to the legal
arguments presented in court by the American attorneys whom the
Ambassador had appointed to prosecute the case.36 Later the sec-
ond-ranking American diplomat in Berlin invited Stern to dinner
at his home.3 7 Again the conversation shifted to the Tiede trial and
the diplomatic problems the case created for the United States and
its allies.3 8 Stern felt pressured to protect United States diplomatic
interests even if those interests conflicted with the rights of the
individuals accused of hijacking.
The trial itself provided visible testimony that this case had trig-
gered foreign relations concerns. Uniformed Soviet Army officers
photographed jurors as they arrived at the courtroom.3 9 The Prose-
cutor General of Warsaw personally escorted the crew of the Polish
airliner to Berlin to testify at the hijacking trial. In addition, Po-
lish intelligence agents sat in the front row of the courtroom to
remind the crew that its testimony should toe the Polish govern-
ment's line.40
33. Id. at 226. For a description of the Berlin Airlift, see infra note 144.
34. Ironically, but for his questionable ruling on the defendants' demand for a jury trial,
see supra note 29, Stern would not have worried about any possibility of prejudice from this
celebration.
35. Walter J. Stoessel, the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many from 1976-1981, was a career member of the foreign service. Prior to his assignment in
Germany, Stoessel had been the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union. THE INTERNA-
TIONAL WHO'S WHO, 1984-85, at 1369 (48th ed. 1984). In Germany, Stoessel's main residence
was in Bonn, but he also maintained a residence in Berlin, where he entertained Stern.
Stern, supra note 14, at 91-92.
36. Stern, supra note 14, at 91-92.
37. The American minister to Berlin, David Anderson, was the highest-ranking State De-
partment official assigned to Berlin. In the absence of Ambassador Walter Stoessel, who
generally resided in the American Embassy in Bonn, see supra note 35, Anderson enter-
tained Stern. Stern, supra note 14, at 167.
38. Stern, supra note 14, at 168-70.
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id. at 274.
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Somewhat to Stern's surprise, the end of the trial-in which
Tiede was found guilty of taking a hostage but acquitted of hi-
jacking4 1-did not end the diplomatic pressure. As the criminal
trial concluded, a group of West German citizens filed a civil suit
in the United States Court for Berlin. Buoyed by Stern's earlier
ruling that the United States Constitution applied in West Ber-
lin,42 they alleged that the recent construction of United States
military housing in Berlin violated a German zoning law, and
claimed that the United States Constitution guaranteed them judi-
cial review. The German citizens asked Stern either to hear the
case himself or to order the German courts to do so.41
41. The jury returned with a split verdict. It found Tiede not guilty of hijacking, but
guilty of taking a hostage, a conviction with a mandatory minimum sentence of three years.
Stern sentenced Tiede to time served-nine months. Stern, supra note 14, at 370.
The maximum sentence for conviction of taking a hostage is 15 years; a conviction also
imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years. Id. at 351. Although one cannot tell
what provisions Stern relied on, he concluded that the applicable minimum sentence was 6
months rather than 3 years because the jury, despite ultimately finding Tiede guilty,
weighed Tiede's justification for his act against the threat to society. Id. at 359.
42. Strictly speaking, because the sole issue before Stern was the defense motion for a
trial by jury, Stern ruled only that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
applied to the prosecution of Ruske and Tiede. He phrased his March 14, 1979, opinion
more broadly, however, and included an extensive discussion of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the United States Constitution in general. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227,
238-53 (1979). Furthermore, the public, and perhaps Stern as well, perceived that a broader
ruling had been issued: "[Tlhe American Sector of Berlin is and will be governed by the
Constitution of the United States." Stern, supra note 14, at 236. "When Americans gov-
erned in Berlin, the judge ruled, they must obey their own Constitution and give due pro-
cess to those whom they governed." Id. at 342.
43. This lawsuit sought to enjoin the construction of housing for American military per-
sonnel on the basis that German zoning law had not been fully observed by the Berlin city
government, which had acquired title to the land and.had agreed to finance the construc-
tion. The plaintiffs first filed suit against the city government in the Berlin Administrative
Court, but the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction based on lack of consent of
the American occupation authority. The plaintiffs then filed suit against the United States
State Department in federal court in Washington, D.C., but that court also dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. Stern, supra note 14, at 341.
The plaintiffs filed suit again in the German court. Again the American occupation au-
thority refused to consent to jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, Stern stated in the Ruske and
Tiede case that the United States Constitution guaranteed due process to the citizens of
Berlin. The plaintiffs in the zoning case quickly asked the German court to transfer the case
to the United States Court for Berlin. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs appeared in the
United States Court for Berlin and petitioned Judge Stern to hear the case. In the alterna-
tive, they requested him to order the American authorities to consent to jurisdiction in the
German court. Id. at 340-42.
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In response, the American Ambassador to West Germany sent a
letter to Stern outlining the government's position that the United
States Court for Berlin lacked jurisdiction over this civil suit44 and
that the terms of Stern's appointment to the court in Berlin lim-
ited him to the criminal proceedings against Tiede and Ruske.'5
Incensed, Stern refused to take any action on the case unless the
Ambassador withdrew his letter.46 The next morning, the Ambas-
sador notified Stern that his appointment as judge in Berlin had
been terminated. One day later, Stern left Berlin.
The plaintiffs later made this same argument in a suit filed in federal court in Washing-
ton, D.C. The district court's dismissal of the suit was affirmed in Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d
173 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that, assuming arguendo that the due process clause of the United States Consti-
tution applied to the Berlin plaintiffs, the denial of judicial review concerning the housing
construction did not violate due process. Id. at 175.
44. Although article 3 of Law No. 46, supra note 20, grants the United States Court for
Berlin original jurisdiction over most criminal cases in Berlin, article 6 confers a much more
limited grant of jurisdiction over civil cases: "Power conferred upon the Court under this
law may be exercised by the Court in any case removed, transferred or referred to the Court
under the provisions of Allied Kommandatura Law No. 7."
45. The text of the letter follows:
I have been advised that a motion has been made in the United States Court
...for Berlin calling on the Court to exercise jurisdiction with respect to a
matter involving the construction of certain housing in the Dueppel Sued area
of Berlin.
Please be advised that under United States High Commission Law No. 46 of
April 28, 1955, the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court for Berlin is restricted solely
to criminal matters arising under the law in force in Berlin, except for specific
cases removed, referred or transferred to the Court from a German court by
the Commandant. The Dueppel matter has not been so removed, referred or
transferred.
Further, in accordance with Article 2(5) of the U.S. High Commissioner Law
46, and as Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in Germany, I should
like to state that your appointment as a Judge of the United States Court for
Berlin does not extend to this matter.
46. Stern, supra note 14, at 372-73.
47. Stoessel's letter to Stern read:
I have been informed that the defendant in United States as United States
element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede, has been sentenced and that
the criminal proceeding for which the United States Court for Berlin was con-
vened has thus been concluded.
Accordingly, as Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in Germany,
acting pursuant to Article 2(5) of U.S. High Commissioner Law No. 46, I
hereby terminate your appointment as a judge of the United States Court for
Berlin, effective May 28, 1979.
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B. An Executive Branch Tribunal
Stern faced difficult issues. The creation of a United States court
in Germany in 1979 to try a case against an East German citizen
accused of violating the German Penal Code was an aberration.
Novel questions of what American law applied and how it applied
arose daily. The threshold legal issue, however, escaped attention.
No one examined the constitutionality of prosecuting Detlef Tiede,
a German civilian charged with committing a non-military crime in
Germany, in an article II American court.4"
The United States Court for Berlin is a federal tribunal, estab-
lished in 1955 by an ordinance promulgated by the post-war Office
of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.49 It pos-
sesses "original jurisdiction [over] any criminal case arising under
legislation in effect in the United States Sector of Berlin if the of-
fense was committed within the area of Greater Berlin."50 The
United States Ambassador to West Germany appoints its judges.51
They serve at the Ambassador's pleasure, and they enjoy no guar-
anteed protection against reductions in salary.2 Clearly, therefore,
the United States Court for Berlin does not exist pursuant to arti-
cle III of the United States Constitution.
48. In JUDGMENT IN BERLIN, supra note 34, Stern never mentioned the potential unconsti-
tutionality of the criminal trial of a civilian in the United States Court for Berlin. The
defendants lacked any incentive to challenge the jurisdiction of the American court because
the alternatives to this proceeding were prosecution in a West German court, without a jury,
or extradition to East Germany. The prosecution, which had initiated the case in the United
States Court for Berlin, did not address the constitutionality of assigning non-military cases
to that tribunal, but emphasized in related matters the unique status of Berlin as a zone
occupied by United States military forces. Brief for the United States at 4-18, United States
v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (1979).
49. Law No. 46, supra note 20. This ordinance established on paper an American court
that never once convened between 1955 and 1978. Stern, supra note 14, at 53.
50. Article 3 of Law No. 46, supra note 20.
51. The personnel [United States Judge for Berlin, United States Attorney for Ber-
lin, Special Assistant United States Attorneys for Berlin, Clerk-Marshal of the
United States Court for Berlin] shall be appointed by the Chief of Mis-
sion. . . . [T]he term "Chief of Mission" means the United States High Com-
missioner for Germany as well as the chief of the United States diplomatic
mission in Germany.
Id. at article 2.
52. "The Chief of Mission may terminate such appointment [of the personnel he ap-
points] at any time." Id. With regard to salaries of personnel appointed to the United States
Court for Berlin, Law No. 46 is silent.
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At first glance, the United States Court for Berlin does not fall
within any of Marathon's three categories of permissible non-arti-
cle III federal courts.5 3 From an historical perspective, however,
53. The three categories are military courts, territorial courts, and courts adjudicating
public rights. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. For a discussion of the first category,
military courts, see infra text accompanying notes 58-105. The third category, public rights
courts, refers to adjudication by administrative agencies of statutory rights created by Con-
gress. The criminal prosecution of Tiede bears no resemblance to the type of case adjudi-
cated in the public rights category.
The territorial court category, at first glance, appears to offer a possible rationale for the
existence of the United States Court for Berlin because the ordinance creating the United
States Court for Berlin places a geographical limitation on the court. Article 4 of Law No.
46, supra note 20 provides: "Process. . . shall run throughout the United States Sector of
Berlin." Article 3 grants the court jurisdiction over "any criminal case arising under any
legislation in effect in the United States Sector of Berlin if the offense was committed
within the area of Greater Berlin." One could therefore argue that the United States Court
for Berlin is a territorial court and, as such, is an exception to article III condoned by the
Supreme Court.
Examination of the territorial court exception to article m and of the facts giving rise to
the United States Court for Berlin belies such an assertion; however. First, the United
States always has indicated quite explicitly that the United States court is one established
pursuant to the President's war power. The government never has hinted that this tribunal
was established as a territorial court.
Second, the territorial court exception rests on the Constitution's express grant to Con-
gress of power over the territories of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Courts
created by Congress pursuant to this plenary grant of power are allowed to adjudicate fed-
eral judicial matters in the territories. Congress did not establish the United States Court
for Berlin pursuant to its territorial powers. In fact, the court was not established by Con-
gress at all; it was established solely by the executive branch.
Third, the framers gave Congress plenary powers over the territories because no state
acted as sovereign in those areas. No government existed in the territories until Congress
acted. Any government established would necessarily be federal. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 545 (1962) (plurality opinion). By investing broad powers in Congress, the framers
ensured that Congress would have the flexibility to organize the governance of the territories
in ways that would best accommodate the needs of the nation and the particular character-
istics of a territory. The policy behind congressional control of territories is inapplicable
when the President rather than the Congress controls the area. More fundamentally, West
Berlin is not analogous to the Louisiana Purchase or the Oklahoma Territory. No govern-
ment void exists in West Berlin that Congress needs to fill. West Berlin possesses a well-
established indigenous government that has been carrying out municipal and state functions
for more than three decades. Functioning court systems exist and carry on the judicial tasks
similar to those that a state court system would assume in the United States. See infra
notes 103-04.
Fourth, a major justification for permitting a system of non-article In courts in the terri-
tories is a logistical one. As explained in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (plurality
opinion):
[Because the] entire governmental responsibility in a territory where there was
no state government to assume the burden of local regulation devolved upon
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the United States Court for Berlin is a military court. Its anteced-
ents are the military tribunals established in Germany by the
American occupying forces in 1945. As this Article discusses be-
low, 54 the President established these tribunals pursuant to his war
power. 5 Because these courts were article II courts, they were not
a part of the judicial branch of the federal government nor were
their judges members of the federal judiciary.
Based on the diplomatic maneuvering triggered by Tiede's hi-
jacking, one can also characterize the United States Court for Ber-
lin as a court convened by the President of the United States pur-
suant to his power to conduct foreign relations. 56  Whether a
"foreign relations" court or a military court, the American court in
the National Government, ... courts had to be established and staffed with
sufficient judges to handle the general jurisdiction that elsewhere would have
been exercised in large part by the courts of a State. But when the territories
began entering into statehood, as they soon did, the authority of the territorial
courts over matters of state concern ceased; in a time when the size of the
federal judiciary was still relatively small, that left the National Government
with a significant number of territorial judges on its hands and no place to put
them. When Florida was admitted as a State, for example, Congress replaced
three territorial courts of general jurisdiction comprising five judges with one
Federal District Court and one judge.
Id. at 545. This rationale does not apply to the American court in Berlin. The rationale is
predicated on the assumption that a territory is a temporary status for a geographical area
belonging to the sovereign and on the assumption that territories are incipient states. Al-
though the United States occupies Berlin only temporarily, the United States has never
assumed-and has no apparent intention of assuming-sovereignty over Berlin. Nor does
the United States intend to confer statehood on Berlin or integrate Berlin into the United
States in any permanent way.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 58-105.
55. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States. . . ." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. This constitutional grant of power is the basis for the
executive branch's control over the military, over the methods of carrying on warfare, and
over incidents to warfare such as military tribunals. For a survey of military courts created
by the executive branch, see infra text accompanying notes 58-105.
56. "[The President] shall have Power ... to make Treaties ... and ... shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ... ." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. "He
shall . . . receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers...." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Although the text of the Constitution does not grant plenary executive power over foreign
affairs to the President, the traditional view is that the President has primary authority in
conducting the foreign affairs of the United States. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 5, at 172. As a unanimous Supreme Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936): "[T]he President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation .... The President is the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
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Berlin exists as an executive tribunal and is not part of the federal
judicial branch. Consequently, in order to decide whether this
court can adjudicate federal criminal charges without running
afoul of article III of the Constitution, one must examine the facts
of the 1978 hijacking case in light of the President's war power and
foreign relations power.
A similar analysis will apply to other instances of criminal trials
assigned to non-article III federal courts. If the President of the
United States in the future decides to establish an American court
outside the geographical boundaries of the United States in order
to try hijackers who seize American citizens or property, he is
likely to rely either on his war power or on his foreign relations
power. Such an executive branch tribunal57 would lack an indepen-
dent judiciary insulated from the political pressures to which the
executive branch is exposed. The creation of such a court would
thus trigger serious separation of powers concerns. Accordingly, be-
cause assigning federal criminal cases to executive branch tribunals
threatens the constitutional structure of three separate and inde-
pendent branches of government, an examination of the Presi-
dent's war power and foreign relations power to see if they provide
legitimate justifications for convening American courts overseas to
adjudicate hijacking charges becomes crucial.
57. The Constitution does not preclude establishing article I courts overseas. Article III
does not limit the federal judicial branch in any geographical dimension. Rather, article III
limits the federal judicial branch to the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in
cases or controversies that fall within nine enumerated categories. As long as a federal court
overseas exercises the judicial power of the United States, as defined by the nine categories
enumerated in article III, and is staffed by judges protected by the article IlI safeguards of
judicial independence, Congress may establish that court as an article III court. That article
III courts overseas can be constitutionally established does not mean that doing so would be
wise. Certainly, article III courts overseas would face many more difficulties in issuing effec-
tive process and in enforcing judgments than would article III courts in the United States.
One should note, however, that difficulties with enforcing process and judgments would pre-
sent the same problems for non-article I courts overseas that they would for article III
courts overseas. Thus, an overseas executive branch tribunal would not be more advanta-
geous from the point of view of enforcement of court orders. An article II court would offer
one practical advantage, however. It could be created overnight by presidential proclama-
tion, whereas an act of Congress is required to establish a new article I court.
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IV. EXECUTIVE BRANCH FEDERAL COURTS AND THE WAR POWER
Although the framers of the Constitution confined the judicial
power of the United States to an independent branch, created by
article III, in order to prevent the President or Congress from con-
trolling the federal courts, a system of federal military courts de-
veloped outside article III. Congress and the Executive created
these courts pursuant to their constitutional powers to regulate the
armed forces.58
The military courts have been justified because the nation's need
for an efficient, well-disciplined fighting force requires that the
military possess authority to adjudicate matters without the "often
deliberately cumbersome concepts of civilian jurisprudence. 5' His-
torical evidence that the framers contemplated a military court
system existing outside the judicial branch further justifies the
constitutionality of these non-article III military courts. The his-
torical evidence, discussed below, clearly indicates that military
courts are a time-honored exception to article III. They have been
part of the federal government for as long as the nation has
existed.
A. Federal Military Courts: An Historical Overview
1. Courts-martial
Military tribunals commonly known as courts-martial long pre-
dated the United States Constitution. The Articles of War, en-
acted by the Continental Congress in 1775 to govern the American
Revolutionary Army, expressly provided for trial by court-martial
of soldiers and civilians serving with the army. 1 In 1789, soon after
58. "The Congress shall have Power To... make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. "The President shall
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1.
59. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969).
60. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 349 n.15 (1952).
61. Article 32 of the American Articles of War of 1775 provided: "All suttlers and retailers
to a camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with the continental army in the field,
though not inlisted soldiers are to be subject to the articles, rules and regulations of the
continental army." Madsen, 343 U.S. at 349 n.15; see also Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 266 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the ratification of the Constitution, the new Congress adopted the
1775 Articles of War, including provisions for courts-martial. 2 Al-
though revised from time to time, congressional authorization for
courts-martial has remained constant since 1789.3 Consequently, a
military justice system developed that differs in significant ways
from civilian courts. The Supreme Court has described some of the
differences:
A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the defendant's peers
which must decide unanimously, but by a panel of officers em-
powered to act by a two-thirds vote. The presiding officer at a
court-martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence
are protected by tenure and undiminishable salary and nurtured
by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer. Substan-
tially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military
trials. Apart from those differences, the suggestion of the possi-
bility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the of-
ficer who convenes it, selects its members and the counsel on
both sides, and who usually has direct command authority over
its members is a pervasive one in military law, despite strenuous
efforts to eliminate the danger.
A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of jus-
tice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the
overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.6 4
Despite the vast differences between article Il courts and
courts-martial, the constitutionality of trying serious criminal of-
fenses by court-martial is well-established.6 5 Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court warned against permitting an expansive court-martial
jurisdiction:
That a system of specialized military courts, proceeding by prac-
tices different from those obtaining in the regular courts and in
general less favorable to defendants, is necessary to an effective
national defense establishment, few would deny. But the justifi-
cation for such a system rests on the special needs of the mili-
tary, and history teaches that expansion of military discipline
62. Singleton, 361 U.S. at 269 (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 349-50.
64. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
65. E.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (trial by court-martial on charges of
rape and kidnap).
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beyond its proper domain carries with it a threat to liberty. This
Court, mindful of the genuine need for special military courts,
has recognized their propriety in their appropriate sphere, but
in examining the reach of their jurisdiction, it has recognized
that "[t]here are dangers lurking in military trials which were
sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our
Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to restrict
military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed abso-
lutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active
service. ... 1
Troubled by the dangers inherent in military courts, the Su-
preme Court has significantly limited court-martial jurisdiction
during the last thirty years. For example, the Supreme Court pro-
hibits trial by court-martial of soldiers discharged from the armed
forces for crimes committed during military service.17 It also for-
bids trials of civilians.68 Even soldiers on active duty may not be
tried by court-martial if charged with non-service-connected
crimes.6 9
2. Military Commissions
Courts-martial are not the only authorized military tribunals.
Military commissions held trials during the Revolutionary War,
the Mexican War, the Civil War, Reconstruction, the Spanish-
American War, World War I, and World War II.7° They came into
wide use during the Mexican War. General Winfield Scott con-
vened them to try offenses outside the narrow jurisdiction given to
courts-martial by Congress.7 1 Following Scott, military com-
manders during the Civil War and Reconstruction assigned
66. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11, 22-23 (1955)).
67. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
68. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (holding unconstitutional court-martial of
civilians charged with noncapital offense); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opin-
ion) (reversing conviction by court-martial of civilian charged with capital offense in non-
occupation zone in peacetime).
69. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
70. Cowles, The Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, 30 A.B.A. J. 330 (1944).
71. Id. at 331; see also Madsen, 343 U.S. at 353 n.20 (quoting S. Rep. No. 229, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 53, 98-99 (General Crowder)).
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thousands of cases to military commissions. 2 In contrast to courts-
martial, the commissions have been convened without legislative
authorization, based solely on the executive's war power.73
Although usually convened during wartime, in some instances
the commissions continued to try cases after hostilities ended.7 4
Military officers generally serve as judges of these commissions,
but on occasion civilians preside over them.75 The President, in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, appoints
the judges, whether military or civilian.76 They serve for the terms
set forth in the appointment and do not receive a guarantee of life
tenure or protection against a reduction in their salaries.77
Despite the lack of these safeguards of judicial independence, a
number of military commissions have tried notorious cases. For ex-
ample, a military commission tried those accused of assassinating
President Lincoln.7 8 In Ex parte Quirin,79 a military commission
tried German spies put ashore by submarine on Long Island and in
72. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 347; Cowles, supra note 70, at 330.
73. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348, 353 n.20; Cowles, supra note 70, at 331. Commissions were
originally established to serve as war courts for cases over which courts-martial did not have
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court said:
[T]he jurisdiction of the court-martial ... is restricted by statute almost ex-
clusively to members of the military force and to certain specific offenses....
It does not extend to many criminal acts, especially of civilians, peculiar to
time of war; and for the trial of these a different tribunal is required ...
Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346 n.9 (citing WINTHROP, MImrrARy LAW AND PRECEDENTS 836 (2d ed.
1920 reprint)).
74. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348, 360; Cowles, supra note 70, at 331.
75. Cowles, supra note 70, at 331.
76. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348.
77. Toth, 350 U.S. at 17; O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 264.
78. Cowles, supra note 70, at 330.
79. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). On June 14, 1942, four German soldiers were landed by submarine
on Amagansett Beach on Long Island, New York. On June 17, 1942, four German soldiers
were landed at Porte Vedra Beach, Florida. All eight carried explosives, fuses, and incendi-
ary and timing devices. All were captured by the FBI. Six of the defendants were citizens of
Germany. One, although born and residing in Germany, alleged that he was a naturalized
citizen of the United States.
The President of the United States, invoking his war power, appointed a military commis-
sion consisting of five military officers to try the defendants on charges of spying and at-
tempted sabotage. A civilian, the Attorney General of the United States, prosecuted the
case. The commission followed procedures prescribed by the President that entitled the de-
fendants to defense counsel, to notice of the charges against them, to present evidence on
their behalf, and to confront witnesses against them. They were not afforded a jury trial,
however, nor were they indicted by a grand jury.
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Florida in 1942. In Quirin the defendants challenged the jurisdic-
tion of the military court, composed of five military officers ap-
pointed by the President, asserting that the Constitution required
that they be tried in an article III court before a jury of their
peers. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Even though
the article III courts were open and functioning throughout the
United States, the Supreme Court ruled that, at least in wartime,
the President could constitutionally assign espionage and sabotage
cases to a military court.80
3. Occupation Courts
In addition to courts-martial and military commissions, a third
category of military tribunals, occupation courts, has long existed
as part of the American military court tradition. Established by
order of military commanders in hostile areas occupied by Ameri-
can military forces, these courts have their genesis in military com-
missions. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimacy of
occupation courts:
Since our nation's earliest days [United States military commis-
sions and occupation courts in the nature of such commissions]
have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many
urgent governmental responsibilities related to war. They have
been called our common-law war courts. They have taken many
forms and borne many names. Neither their procedure nor their
jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute. It has been adapted
in each instance to the need that called it forth. In the absence
of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it ap-
pears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and pre-
scribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions,
and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory
occupied by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to
do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities. The Presi-
dent has the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of com-
bating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the
United States by force of arms. 1
80. Id. at 46.
81. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-48 (1952).
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The most elaborate organization of American occupation courts
existed in Germany in the 1940's and 1950's. Immediately after
World War II, the United States Armed Forces occupying Ger-
many instituted a system of Military Government Courts. 2 In his
role as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General Eisen-
hower ordered the Military Government Courts to apply the Ger-
man Criminal Code, stripped of its Nazi provisions and amended
by any special laws enacted by the occupying forces.8 3 These Amer-
ican occupation courts totally supplanted the German court sys-
tem84 and heard thousands of garden-variety criminal cases.85
In 1949, the American occupation government in Germany un-
derwent a transformation from military to civilian status. The
United States Courts of the Allied High Commission, a court sys-
tem under the aegis of the State Department rather than the De-
partment of the Army, replaced the Military Government Courts.8 6
The new American courts, located throughout the area occupied by
United States forces, continued to decide cases under the German
Criminal Code.87 Together, these occupation courts decided more
than 600,000 criminal cases between 1945 and 1953, trying Ameri-
cans as well as Germans.88
Challenges to the jurisdiction that American occupation courts
exercised over civilians thus far have been unsuccessful. In 1952, in
Madsen v. Kinsella,89 the Supreme Court upheld the homicide
conviction of an American civilian tried in Germany by an Ameri-
can occupation court. Yvette Madsen shot and killed her husband,
an American military officer, at their residence in Germany in
1949. Both Madsens were American citizens. Yvette Madsen had
82. Nobleman, The Administration of Justice in the United States Zone of Germany, 8
FED. B.J. 70 (1946).
83. Id. at 71, 75.
84. Id. at 91.
85. See, e.g., Madsen, 343 U.S. at 358 n.23; McCauley, American Courts in Germany:
600,000 Cases Later, 40 A.BA J. 1041, 1042-43 (1954).
86. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 357. In 1948 the Military Government had replaced the military
courts with a system of "civilian" courts. These courts, an arm of the military occupying
forces, were called United States Military Government Courts. For a description of Ordi-
nance No. 31, see infra notes 90-91. See also Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 236.
87. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356, 361-62.
88. McCauley, supra note 85, at 1041-45.
89. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
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accompanied her husband to his assignment in the zone of Ger-
many occupied by the United States. Soon after the shooting,
United States Military Police arrested Yvette Madsen and charged
her with murder in violation of the German Criminal Code. The
American occupation court that heard the case consisted of three
American civilians appointed by the United States Military Gover-
nor to serve as judges.90 The court convicted Madsen of murder
and sentenced her to 15 years in prison, and the occupation ap-
peals court, composed of five civilians appointed by the Military
Governor, affirmed. Madsen was confined in the federal peniten-
tiary for women in West Virginia."1
From prison Madsen petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, al-
leging that the occupation court in Germany lacked jurisdiction to
try her. Both the federal district court in West Virginia92 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit93 denied
Madsen's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts.
In a lengthy opinion for the eight-member majority, Justice Burton
reviewed the history of American occupation courts in general and
the post-World War II occupation courts in Germany in particular.
He noted that as the United States government in Germany
changed from a military to a civilian government, the occupation
court system underwent a similar transformation."4 Nonetheless,
he emphasized that the civilian occupation courts
90. Id. at 362. Two of the civilians were appointed as district judges; the third was ap-
pointed as a magistrate. 343 U.S. at 344. On August 18, 1948, United States Military Gov-
ernment Ordinance No. 31 established a system of United States Military Government
Courts. Article 3 of this ordinance created a district court in each judicial district within the
United States area of control and authorized each district court to consist of one or more
district judges and one or more magistrates, who sat both singly and as a panel. Capital
crimes were heard by panels of three, and the death penalty could only be imposed by a
unanimous decision of the court. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 365 app.
91. Article 13 of Ordinance No. 31, supra note 90, established a Court of Appeals of the
United States Military Government Courts. On December 28, 1949, the United States High
Commission for Germany changed the name of the court to the Court of Appeals of the
United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 370-
71 (citing Allied High Commission Law No. 1, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086 (effective date January 1,
1950)).
92. 93 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.W. Va. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S.
341 (1952).
93. 188 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
94. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356-60.
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derived their authority from the President as occupation courts,
or tribunals in the nature of military commissions, in areas still
occupied by United States troops. Although the local govern-
ment was no longer a "Military Government," it was a govern-
ment prescribed by an occupying power and it depended upon
the continuing military occupancy of the territory.
The government of the occupied area thus passed merely from
the control of the United States Department of Defense to that
of the United States Department of State. The military func-
tions continued to be important and were administered under
the direction of the Commander of the United States Armed
Forces in Germany. He remained under orders to take the nec-
essary measures, on request of the United States High Commis-
sioner, for the maintenance of law and order and to take such
other action as might be required to support the policy of the
United States in Germany.95
Further, the Supreme Court approved the civilian nature of the
occupation court that convicted Madsen, noting that "[t]he volume
of business, the size of the area, the number of civilians affected,
the duration of the occupation and the need for establishing confi-
dence in civilian procedure emphasized the propriety of tribunals
of a nonmilitary character."98 In closing, the Court added that, al-
though the basis for an occupation court is military conquest,
"[t]he authority for such commissions does not necessarily expire
upon cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty
of peace. It may continue long enough to permit the occupying
power to discharge its responsibilities fully. ''97
The United States Court for Berlin, over which Stern presided,
is a direct descendant of the court that convicted Madsen. It still
exists because technically the military occupation of Berlin still
continues.
In 1955, the United States, England, and France terminated
their military occupation of West Germany."8 At that time, the
Federal Republic of Germany took over all the government func-
95. Id. at 357.
96. Id. at 358.
97. Id. at 360.
98. Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime, October 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117,
T.I.A.S. No. 3425, 331 U.N.T.S. 253.
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tions, judicial and otherwise, that the occupiers had exercised.
Thus, the occupation courts ceased to exist.99 The three occupying
powers did not end their occupation of West Berlin, however. In-
stead, they remained in force, as did the Soviets who occupied East
Berlin. Shortly before his position was eliminated in 1955, the
United States High Commissioner of Germany, foreseeing the po-
tential future need for an American court in the remaining occu-
pied territory, promulgated a regulation establishing the United
States Court for Berlin.'00 The regulation defined the jurisdiction
of the court, according it jurisdiction over criminal offenses com-
mitted in Berlin and over certain selected civil cases.' 0'
Today, the United States, England, and France still continue to
maintain military forces in West Berlin. Officially they state that
the "governments [of England, France and the United States] ...
continue . . . to exercise supreme authority in the Western Sectors
of Berlin.' 011 2 Despite such statements by the occupying powers,
the Germans carry out the daily functions of government in West
Berlin. 103 For example, a full-fledged system of German courts ex-
ists in Berlin. 0 4 This German judicial system has handled all crim-
inal and civil proceedings initiated in West Berlin since 1955. Ac-
99. .United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 237 (1979).
100. Law No. 46, supra note 20.
101. Law No. 46, supra note 20, at articles 3, 6.
102. Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, 343 T.I.A.S. 7551.
See infra text accompanying notes 135-37.
103. Although the Allied Kommandatura reserves to itself ultimate control over the for-
eign relations of Berlin, the Federal Republic of Germany represents Berlin abroad. In most
respects Berlin functions as a Land (state) of the Federal Republic. Most treaties of the
Federal Republic of Germany apply to Berlin.
With regard to the legislature, Berlin sends 22 representatives to the Bundestag and 4 to
the Bundesrat. On occasion a Berlin representative sitting as Chairman of the Bundesrat
has acted as chief of state in the absence of the president of the Federal Republic. Willy
Brandt, a mayor of Berlin, became the Chancellor of the Federal Republic. Lush, The Rela-
tionship Between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 742,
771, 780 (1965).
Indeed, in light of the extension of the laws and judicial system of the Federal Republic of
Germany to Berlin, some German constitutional lawyers argue that Berlin has become a
Land of the Federal Republic. Bathurst, Legal Aspects of the Berlin Problem, 38 BR. Y.B.
INT'L L. 255, 270-71 (1962).
104. The judicial system of the Federal Republic of Germany includes Berlin. Parties may
appeal cases from the Berlin courts to all but one of the superior Federal Republic courts.
Two of the superior Federal courts, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht) and the Federal Disciplinary Court (Bundesdisziplinarhof), are actually located in
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cordingly, the United States Court for Berlin never convened in
more than two decades. 10 5 In the fall of 1978, however, the dor-
mant American court in Berlin slowly and reluctantly came to life
at the insistence of the government of West Germany.
B. The Military Occupation Court in Berlin: A Contemporary
Perspective
The history of American military tribunals indicates that they
are part of a flexible court system existing outside of the federal
judicial branch created by article III. The composition and juris-
diction of these courts are not fixed; they change to fit changing
circumstances. Nonetheless, whatever the form of military court, it
may hear trials only to the extent necessary to maintain military
order. If allowing military courts to preside over a trial fails to fur-
ther this goal, then the military trial is not a legitimate exercise of
the war power.
Although American military forces are stationed today in Berlin
and official papers proclaim that the United States occupies a sec-
tor of West Berlin as a result of military conquest, four decades
have passed since hostilities ended between Germany and the
United States. Three decades have elapsed since the Allied mili-
tary occupation forces that governed Germany withdrew in fa-gor of
German civilian government. Additionally, the social dysfunction
that characterized post-war Germany in the immediate aftermath
of World War II-and that justified the occupation government's
existence-no longer exists. The United States occupies West Ber-
lin in name only. The American "occupiers" no longer concern
themselves with maintaining military order over an exhausted and
resentful civilian population. Instead, the American military per-
sonnel in Berlin today seek to bolster an ally. They are not forces
whose right to be there is based solely on military conquest.
As a result of these changes, one can say that the United States
"occupation" of Berlin justified convening an American military
court there in 1979 to try a civilian charged with air piracy only by
elevating form over substance. The German courts in Berlin were
Berlin, as is the Fifth (Criminal) Division of the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht-
shof). Lush, supra note 103, at 780.
105. Stern, supra note 14, at 53.
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fully capable and competent to try the case without in any way
interfering with any American interest in a continued military
presence in Berlin. Consequently, the military rationale does not
satisfy the constitutional requirement limiting the jurisdiction of
military tribunals to those cases that further the goal of maintain-
ing military order. In light of the circumstances in Berlin at the
time Tiede arrived in 1978, therefore, his criminal trial in a mili-
tary court was improper.
An analysis of the justifications advanced for convening military
courts in the past and their application to the facts of the Tiede
hijacking demonstrates that Tiede's prosecution before an Ameri-
can military court violated the Constitution. During the two hun-
dred year history of American military courts, a number of factors
have been significant in determining whether a military tribunal
rather than an article III court may adjudicate cases. A paramount
consideration has been the status of the accused. If he is a member
of the United States military forces, a presumption exists that a
military court may hear his case based on the "need for a prompt
ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and order [within
the military ranks.]" 106 On the other hand, if the accused is a civil-
ian, military courts rarely possess authority to try the case. 10 7 As
the Supreme Court explained:
106. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955). This presumption is
overridden in certain circumstances. If the defendant has been accused of a non-service
connected offense committed off post in the United States during peacetime, he is entitled
to an article III court. O'Callahan, 359 U.S. at 274. If a serviceman is charged with an
offense committed on a military base and violates the security of a person or property there,
however, that offense is "service-connected" and may be tried by a court-martial. Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 369 (1971).
107. The Supreme Court said:
Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the military ranks
there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and
order. But Army discipline will not be improved by court-martialing rather
than trying by jury some civilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated
from the service for months, years or perhaps decades. Consequently, consider-
ations of discipline provide no excuse for new expansion of court-martial juris-
diction at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system of
trial by jury.
Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize
trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to "the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed." We hold that Congress
cannot subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other
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The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy,
required other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by
the common law courts; and, in pursuance of the power con-
ferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared the kinds of
trial and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for of-
fenses committed while the party is in the military or naval ser-
vice. Every one connected with these branches of public service
is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for
their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his right
to be tried by the civil courts. All other persons, citizens of
states where the courts are open, if charged with crime, are
guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury [in a civil
court]. This privilege is a vital principle underlying the whole
administration of criminal justice; it is not held by sufferance,
and cannot be frittered away on any plea of state or political
necessity.1os
Although article III courts usually try civilians like Tiede ac-
cused of criminal offenses, in certain circumstances military courts
have tried civilians, justifying their actions as necessary incidents
to the maintenance of military order. For example, during time of
war military courts have tried civilians in areas where actual hostil-
ities occur.10 9 Similarly, during a military occupation, the military's
need to control the conquered territory has justified assigning tri-
als of civilians to military courts.110 Thus, if a state of war, a mili-
tary occupation, or some other significant military reason"' exists,
the maintenance of military order may justify constitutionally the
trial of a civilian in a military court.
Because Tiede was not a member of the United States military
when he diverted the Polish plane to Berlin in 1978, his status can-
civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in
the regular courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution.
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
108. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., id. at 127.
110. See e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 35 n.63 (plurality opinion); Madsen v. Kinsella,
343 U.S. at 356-60.
111. For example, the location or type of crime may have a serious impact on the mili-
tary. See Relford, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (offense committed on military base gave rise to trial
by court-martial); Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (espionage and sabotage charges during wartime
gave rise to trial by military commission); Bell v. Clark, 437 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971) (rape
by American soldier stationed in Germany gave rise to trial by court-martial).
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not justify assigning his criminal prosecution to an American mili-
tary court. Accordingly, some other reason must exist in order to
justify allowing an American military court to adjudicate his case.
An examination of the facts of Tiede's hijacking reveals the pres-
ence of some factors that in the past have led to military trials of
civilians. For example, World War II has never been concluded by
a treaty of peace between the United States and Germany." 2 Fur-
thermore, the Allied occupation of Berlin technically has never en-
ded. 3 In addition, significant numbers of American troops remain
in West Berlin. Some of these soldiers in fact reside at the very
American air base where Tiede's plane landed. Closer analysis,
however, reveals that each of these factors fails to justify assigning
Tiede's criminal trial to a military court.
1. Declared War
When the United States has declared war and is engaged in ac-
tual hostilities, the President's war power in some instances justi-
fies convening military courts to try civilians. Indeed, historical ev-
idence indicates that the framers envisioned that military courts
would exert criminal jurisdiction over certain civilians in wartime.
For example, in colonial times a number of civilians who provi-
sioned the armies faced trial by court-martial." 4 The Supreme
Court, however, has steadily narrowed the jurisdiction of military
courts over civilians. During the Civil War, the Supreme Court
112. The state of war between the United States and Germany was formally terminated
by Presidential Proclamation, Proclamation No. 2950, 16 Fed. Reg. 10,915 (1951), and Joint
Resolution of Congress, H.J. Res. 289, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The United States never
concluded a peace treaty with Germany, however, although the United States has concluded
peace treaties with Italy, Treaty of Peace, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, T.I.A.S. No. 1648, 49
U.N.T.S. 3, and Japan, Treaty of Peace, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136
U.N.T.S. 45. Apparently, the United States is waiting to conclude a peace treaty with a
reunited Germany. See Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D.
227 (1979). The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have entered into sev-
eral treaties, however. E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Protocol
and Exchange of Notes, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839; T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3;
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, June 30, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 5999; T.I.A.S. No. 3443; 240
U.N.T.S. 47.
113. See supra text accompanying note 102.
114. Suttlers, retailers, and other civilians who performed services for the armed forces in
the field during wartime were subject to trial by court-martial. Reid, 354 U.S. at 33 n.60
(plurality opinion); Madsen, 243 U.S. at 349 n.15.
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struck down a military court's conviction of a civilian in Indiana in
Ex parte Milligan.11 5 The defendant in that case stood convicted
of conspiring to aid the rebellious southern forces. Despite the fact
that Indiana was a military district at the time the defendant was
arrested, that the Confederacy still existed, and that the defendant
was charged with aiding the enemy, the Supreme Court stated that
a military trial violated the Constitution so long as the civilian
courts functioned. 116 The Court further emphasized that military
trials of civilians may exist only in "the locality of actual war ' ' 1 or
in an area in imminent threat of foreign invasion.11 8 The Court
clearly indicated that it would look behind the formalities to evalu-
ate the realities of military action.
During World War II, the Supreme Court also faced a challenge
to trial by military court. In Ex parte Quirin,19 the Court upheld a
military court's conviction of seven defendants accused of at-
tempted espionage and sabotage in the United States. The Court
rejected the defendants' contention that the availability of civilian
courts throughout the United States made a military trial uncon-
stitutional. Emphasizing that the United States was at war with
Germany, that the defendants were citizens of Germany, that the
defendants had entered the United States surreptitiously on a mil-
itary mission to sabotage American war industries, and that the
law of war outlaws sabotage and espionage behind enemy lines, the
Court ruled that, pursuant to his war power, the President could
assign this trial to a military court rather than to an article III
court.1 2 As in Milligan, the Supreme Court examined the factual
115. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
116. The concurrence based its decision on statutory grounds and explicitly disavowed
the sweep of the majority's constitutional holding. Specifically, the concurrence found that
Congress had not authorized military commissions to try and sentence civilians in states
such as Indiana where the civil courts had remained open and uninterrupted throughout the
course of the war. The concurrence concluded, however, that in wartime Congress does have
the power, should it so choose, to authorize military trials for crimes against the security
and safety of the armed forces in localities it deems to be threatened by great public danger.
Id. at 136, 140-42 (Chase, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 127.
118. Id.
119. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
120. Id. at 25. According to the Quirin opinion, the law of war includes "that part of the
law of nations which prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights, and duties of
enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals." Id. at 27-28. The law of war draws a distinc-
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circumstances of the case, not merely the government's formal
characterization of it. The defendants' status as enemy belligerents
who had entered the territory of the United States to carry out
acts of war against the United States, especially during a period of
actual hostilities when the threat of invasion was significant, was
crucial to the court's analysis.
The trial of a hijacker in a military court in Berlin in 1979 tech-
nically stems from the same military conflict involved in Quirin.
The United States declared war against Germany in December
1941.121 Although Germany surrendered in May 1945122 and the Al-
lied High Commission transferred the reins of government to the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1955,123 the United States has not
yet concluded a treaty of peace with Germany.1 24 One could say,
therefore, that the state of war declared in 1941 still exists.125 Such
an unrealistic assertion, however, cannot serve as a legitimate basis
for the extraordinary assignment of the criminal trial of a civilian
to a military court.
tion between lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants (typically soldiers in uni-
form) are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.
Unlawful combatants (such as those who during war secretly and without uniform cross
military lines in order to destroy life and property or gather military information) are not
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, but are subject to trial and punishment by mili-
tary commissions. Id. at 30-31. United States citizens who align themselves with enemy mili-
tary forces and who enter this country with the aid and guidance of the enemy for the
purpose of committing hostile acts are unlawful combatants and are not exempt from the
consequences of violating the law of war. Id. at 37-38. Like alien enemies, citizen enemies
are outside the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury because they have violated the law
of war by committing offenses constitutionally triable by a military tribunal. Id. at 44.
121. On December 11, 1941, Congress issued a declaration of war against Germany, S.J.
Res. 119, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 331, 55 Stat. 796 (1941) and Italy, S.J. Res. 120,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 332, 55 Stat. 797 (1941). Three days earlier, Congress had
declared war against Japan, S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 328, 55 Stat.
795 (1941).
122. In May 1945, the German Army surrendered to the Allied Forces at Reims, France.
The surrender was signed on May 7, to become effective on May 8-9, 1945. 23 ENCYCLOPAE-
DuA BRITANNICA 775 (1969). The Japanese proclaimed an unconditional surrender to the Al-
lied Forces on August 14, 1945. The formal surrender was signed on September 2, 1945,
aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Id. at 782.
123. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 112.
125. The Presidential Proclamation and Joint Resolution of Congress, supra note 112,
declaring an end to hostilities belie this contention, however.
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Furthermore, Tiede did not enter the United States zone of Ber-
lin during a time of actual combat in order to commit an act of
war. Moreover, no imminent danger of invasion of the United
States by East or West Germany existed when Tiede's hijacking
occurred and was tried. The political tension between East Berlin
and the United States sector of West Berlin and the presence of
opposing military forces garrisoned in each zone also fail to justify
trying Tiede in an American military court. The Milligan case
makes clear that military courts may not adjudicate criminal
charges against civilians based on the threat of armed conflict with
a potential military enemy.126
In these circumstances, the Milligan and Quirin cases teach that
the lack of a peace treaty between the United States and Germany
fails to justify trying a German civilian in an American military
court. If such a court possesses the power to try Tiede under the
President's war power, another justification must exist.
2. Occupation
One can argue that, although the armed combat of World War II
has ended, the continuing United States military occupation of
Berlin justifies assigning criminal trials of civilians to a military
court. In many instances in the past, American military courts
have tried civilians during a military occupation. The need to
maintain military order in recently conquered territories is a legiti-
mate basis for convening military commissions and occupation
courts. 117 In an occupation, military forces replace the civilian gov-
ernment, and the situation is most likely precarious, even though
armed combat may have ended. The military commander needs to
protect the physical safety of the occupying troops, subdue pockets
of resistance, and control the local civilian population so that loot-
ing and destruction of weaker citizens does not become rampant.
In light of these factors and the social disruption and resentment
likely to exist during a military occupation, judges in the occupa-
tion courts must understand the military consequences of the deci-
sions they make. Acknowledging the desirability of having courts
sensitive to military requirements and able to adjudicate swiftly
126. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
127. See, e.g., Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348, 356.
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the problems that arise in an occupation, the Supreme Court
stated, "in enemy territory . ..conquered and held by force of
arms and. . . governed at the time by our military forces. . . the
army commander can establish military or civilian commissions as
an arm of the occupation to try everyone in the occupied area,
whether they are connected with the army or not.'128 Thus, in situ-
ations where United States forces occupy enemy territory, the
President's war power may justify military trials of civilians even
after actual hostilities cease.
In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that American mili-
tary occupation courts could try civilians charged with serious
criminal offenses committed in Germany even though the incidents
and crimes took place four and one-half years after armed combat
had ended. In Madsen v. Kinsella,29 the Court recognized Ameri-
can occupation courts in Germany in the decade following World
War II as an essential component of the military government that
administered Germany and deemed them a practical necessity and
constitutionally permissible. German society was in disarray, Ger-
man courts had ceased functioning, and American military forces
governed Germany. Some American forum for resolving disputes
was therefore necessary. Moreover, because the American occupa-
tion courts were expected to disappear when German civilian gov-
ernment again functioned, granting life tenure to the judges of the
American occupation courts would have been extremely un-
wieldy.130 Thus, establishing article III courts overseas to try cases
during the occupation of Germany was not a viable option."3" In-
128. Reid, 354 U.S. at 35 n.63.
129. 343 U.S. 341, 356 (1952). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying
notes 89-97. The Madsen holding was reaffirmed in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 n.63
(plurality opinion), in which the plurality distinguished between military courts in occupied
areas held by force of arms and military trials of civilians accompanying American soldiers
overseas in areas where there are no actual hostilities underway.
130. In this respect the rationale for non-article III occupation courts is similar to one of
the rationales for territorial courts. See supra note 53 (discussing territoral courts).
131. On the other hand, no territorial limitation exists on article III courts in the Consti-
tution. Article III courts can be established overseas so long as they exercise the judicial
power of the United States. If the American military controls the country where the article
III court is authorized to sit, enforcement of subpoenas and judgments will not present
practical problems. See supra note 57.
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stead, the American military commander in Germany convened
military courts staffed by military personnel. 132
Within a decade after Germany surrendered, the American occu-
pation of Germany and all but one American occupation court
ceased. In 1955 the occupying powers relinquished control of West
Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany, but they did not
relinquish their status as occupiers of West Berlin. In its role as
one of the conquerors, the United States still maintains American
military forces in the American zone of Berlin. Thus, as a result of
the military conquest of 1945, the American military has main-
tained an uninterrupted presence in West Berlin for forty years.
In addition to the physical presence of American servicemen, le-
gal instruments still formally acknowledge American troops as oc-
cupying forces in Berlin. In 1944, before the surrender of Germany,
the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union agreed to
occupy Berlin jointly after Germany surrendered. 3 In the summer
of 1945, the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and
France formally established a joint command to administer the
city of Berlin. They assigned each of the military forces to a sepa-
rate sector, and placed a military commander in charge of adminis-
tering each sector."' In the late 1940's and 1950's, the United
States signed additional declarations authorizing the local Berlin
authorities to exercise greater control of local matters, but continu-
ing to reserve certain powers to the allied forces. 3 5 As recently as
1971 the four wartime allies signed another agreement concerning
132. In the precarious situation of an armed occupation of enemy territory, affording life
tenure to occupation court judges may lead to a problem unrelated to the number of surplus
life-tenured judges when the occupation terminates. If a "rogue" judge begins undermining
the occupying forces and unsettling the local population; the military commander will need
to be able to remove him from the situation quickly. The impeachment process, the only
constitutional method for removing article III judges, would likely work too slowly to ensure
that the situation would be remedied without threatening the viability of the occupation.
133. Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of "Greater Ber-
lin," approved by the European Advisory Commission, September 12, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2078,
T.I.A.S. No. 3071, 227 U.N.T.S. 279.
134. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 232.
135. Committee on Foreign Relations, Declaration on Berlin Governing Relations Be-
tween Allied (Western) Kommandatura and Berlin, U.S. Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 208
(1971), reprinted in DocumENTs ON GERMANY, 1944-1971; Statement of Principles Governing
the Relationship Between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin, DocUMENTS ON
GERMANY, at 158.
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the status of Berlin. 136 This Quadripartite Agreement, which the
Federal Republic of Germany did not sign, includes detailed
promises and obligations regarding travel between East and West
Berlin, travel between West Germany and West Berlin, and similar
matters. It demonstrates that the United States and the other al-
lies still exercise some degree of control over aspects of life in West
Berlin. In conjunction with these written agreements, the allied
forces continue to assert publicly their status as occupiers. Follow-
ing the signing of the 1971 compact, the United States, United
Kingdom, and France notified West Germany that their "govern-
ments will continue, as heretofore, to exercise supreme authority in
the Western Sectors of Berlin."'13 7
Although American, British, and French forces still technically
may occupy West Berlin, they do so in name only. The allied mili-
tary forces do not govern the city. German officials and German
judges staff the municipal machinery 13 unsupervised by the allied
forces; they do not seek approval from the allies for government
decisions. West Berlin today functions-and has functioned for de-
cades-under a civilian German government. 3 9 The American mil-
itary forces, despite their historical antecedents as occupiers who
entered West Berlin as a result of military conquest and remained
to preserve order over an enemy population defeated in war, now
remain in Berlin as reinforcements of a trusted ally.
Not only has the function served by the United States military
forces in Berlin changed dramatically over the last forty years, but
the judicial void that American military courts filled in Germany
in the decade after hostilities ended in 1945 is no longer present.
German courts have tried all the criminal and civil cases litigated
by civilians in West Berlin since 1955. Furthermore, German trials
during that time did not interfere in any way with the continued
American interest in Berlin, nor did the Tiede hijacking affect
American military interests arising from the presence of American
troops in Berlin in 1978. Consequently, one cannot defend Tiede's
criminal trial in a military court as incidental to the military's
136. Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, T.I.A.S. No. 7551.
137. 24 U.S.T. at 343.
138. See supra note 104.
139. See supra note 103.
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need to govern the German population during the occupation. Nor
can one defend it as a legitimate response to the social dysfunction
of German society in the aftermath of World War II. In the ab-
sence of the need for occupying forces to govern and control a war-
torn society, and in the absence of any threat to the military inter-
ests of the vestigial occupying force, a military occupation rationale
fails to justify the trial of Tiede in a military court. His trial vio-
lated the constitutional command limiting the jurisdiction of mili-
tary courts to cases that further the need of the armed forces to
maintain military order.
Admittedly, applying the analysis outlined above may require
federal courts in some situations in the future to undertake the
delicate task of reviewing whether the need for military order has
diminished to such an extent that occupation courts can no longer
try civilians. In light of the deference the executive branch de-
serves in matters affecting the military and foreign policy, courts
will hesitate to declare that a military occupation has effectively
terminated. Nevertheless, federal courts must uphold article HI of
the Constitution. When such an attenuated connection exists be-
tween the initial military conquest and the current state of society,
the courts should discount the legal fiction of occupation and pro-
tect the defendant's right to trial in an article III federal court.140
The Berlin hijacking trial is such a case.141 The nature of the
American "occupation" of Berlin does not permit a military trial.
If the war power is to be considered the justification for this trial,
another rationale must be identified.
140. The Constitution does not guarantee every defendant a trial in an article III court.
Under the Constitution, a defendant may be tried in a state court or in another country's
court, neither of which is established under article III. The Constitution does guarantee the
defendant a trial in an article III court if he is tried by the federal government, however,
unless, of course, his case falls within one of the exceptions to article III recognized by
Marathon and its predecessors.
141. If an active Nazi guerilla force still operated in Germany, and the United States
military forces in Berlin sought to suppress this force, perhaps the occupation of Berlin still
could be characterized legitimately as a direct result of the military conflict in World War
II. That, however, was not the case in the 1970's in Berlin.
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3. Cold War Reinforcements For An Ally
Legal documents and declarations of war notwithstanding, real-
politik is the main reason United States military forces have re-
mained in Berlin for forty years. The government stations Ameri-
can troops there to reinforce the Federal Republic of Germany
against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Forty years of East-
West confrontation over Berlin prove the truth of this assertion.
Relations between the war-time allies occupying Berlin grew
strained in the late 1940's. Although four nations jointly occupied
Berlin, the Soviet Union alone occupied the area surrounding the
city 142 In 1948 the Soviet Union prohibited land traffic from enter-
ing Berlin,143 thus threatening to strangle West Berlin. Accord-
ingly, the United States and Great Britain organized and success-
fully carried out an airlift for more than eleven months.4 The
Soviet forces relaxed the blockade, but political tensions between
the occupying forces continued to run high throughout the 1950's.
The occupation effectively partitioned Berlin into East and
West, with free movement allowed between the western zones oc-
cupied by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, but
restricted access permitted to the eastern sector occupied by the
Soviet Union.145 Hundreds of thousands of East Germans traveled
to West Berlin and never returned home.14 To halt this continuing
hemorrhage of its citizenry, the East Germans erected the Berlin
Wall in 1961.4 Since that time tensions between the United
142. 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 516 (1969); Stern, supra note 14, at 22.
143. 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 516 (1969); Stern, supra note 14, at 23.
144. In an effort to push the Western Allies out of Berlin, the Soviet Union began a
blockade of the city on June 24, 1948, stopping all communication by rail, road, and water-
way with the Western sectors. In response to this blockade, on June 26, the United States
and Great Britain began an airlift of vital supplies to West Berlin. At a cost of $224 million,
more than two million tons of food, fuel, machinery and other necessary goods were flown
into West Berlin, mostly by U.S. aircraft. The blockade, frustrated by the airlift, also proved
damaging to the East German economy because essential railroads and waterways passed
through West Berlin. The Soviet Union finally agreed to lift the blockade on May 4, 1949,
but the airlift continued until Sept. 30, 1949. 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 516 (1969).
145. Stern, supra note 14, at 23.
146. Four million, or approximately one-fifth of the population, fled East Germany from
1945-1961 through West Berlin. 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 517 (1969); Stern, supra note
14, at 23.
147. The construction of the wall began on August 13, 1961. 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
517 (1969); Stern, supra note 14, at 19, 24.
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States and the Soviet Union have waxed and waned, but a war of
nerves continues in Berlin, surrounded as it is by the German
Democratic Republic and isolated from West Germany.
The continued stationing of American soldiers in West Berlin
without doubt serves a contemporary political purpose. The
United States maintains troops in Berlin not out of any fear of the
Nazi forces that were conquered in 1945, but out of fear of the
Soviet Union, one of America's allies in World War H. The United
States government has acknowledged this purpose explicitly:
[A] termination of the occupation in Berlin along the lines of
any of the proposals acceptable to the Soviet Union would result
in the Berliners' loss of freedom and the abandonment of the
immediate post-war goal of a reunified, democratic Ger-
many .... Instead [the United States] has committed itself to
fulfill its "fundamental political and moral obligation" to con-
tinue the occupation in order to protect Berlin and its long-term
objective of a reunified, democratic Germany.... [Further, the]
existence of this island of democracy outside the territory of,
but surrounded by the German Democratic Republic, serves[s]
as a constant psychological and political irritant to the
communists. 48
In other words, the Cold War, not World War II, keeps American
soldiers in Berlin. That an East-West conflict brought to life the
United States Court for Berlin, therefore, is no surprise.
The United States' stationing of military forces overseas to rein-
force an ally during times of geopolitical tension fails to justify as-
signing criminal trials of civilians accused of committing non-mili-
tary offenses to military courts. In 1960 the Supreme Court faced
this issue in Kinsella v. Singleton. '49 In that case the Court struck
148. Brief for the United States at 7-8, United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (1979).
149. 361 U.S. 234 (1960). The court-martial took place in Germany in 1957. Seven justices
of the United States Supreme Court agreed that the defendant, a civilian dependent of a
member of the armed forces, could not be subjected to court-martial for a non-capital of-
fense. Two of the seven, however, refused to join the majority's broader holding that no
court-martial could try a civilian accompanying the armed forces overseas for an offense
committed during peacetime. The concurrence, written by Justice Whittaker, determined
that civilian employees who perform essential services for the military, who are subject to
the orders, directions, and control of military command, and who are entitled to similar
privileges and benefits as members of the military are an integral part of the armed forces
and, therefore, can, under article I, § 8, cl. 14 of the United States Constitution, be sub-
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down the conviction of a civilian tried by court-martial in Ger-
many. The defendant, the wife of an American soldier, lived with
her husband in American housing in Germany. After the death of
one of their children, she and her husband were first charged with
murder and later with involuntary manslaughter. 150 A court-mar-
tial tried both defendants. In upholding the wife's challenge to the
assignment of her case to a military court, the Court ruled that
civilians tried by the American government in peacetime 51 possess
the right to trial in an article III court.15 The presence of Ameri-
can troops overseas, in an effort to bolster the military forces of an
ally, did not justify trial by a military court.1 53
Similarly, the military presence of American soldiers in West
Berlin in 1978 cannot provide a sufficient reason to consign Tiede's
jected to trial by military court-martial for crimes committed overseas in peacetime. Id. at
265, 276-77 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
The two-member dissenting opinion disagreed with the plurality's focus on the "status" of
the defendant, and instead asserted that the "closeness" or "remoteness" of a defendant's
relationship with the military was crucial to deciding the constitutionality of an exercise of
military jurisdiction. Id. at 253, 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Reading clause 14 of article I,
§ 8, in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause, the dissent concluded that Con-
gress has broad power to make any law considered necessary for the good order of the land
and naval forces, including laws conferring military jurisdiction over civilians who have close
relationships with the military. Id. at 253, 257 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
150. They were charged with unpremeditated murder under article 118(2) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The charges were withdrawn in order to allow the defendants to
plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter under article 119 of the Code. Id. at 236.
151. The Court examined a situation that did not involve an occupation of enemy terri-
tory. Although Kinsella v. Singleton did not explicitly refer to Madsen v. Kinsella, it also
did not hint that it had been overturned. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. at 35 n.63 (plurality
opinion).
152. The Court said: "We therefore hold that Mrs. Dial is protected by the specific provi-
sions of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and that her prosecution and con-
viction by court-martial are not permissible." Singleton, 361 U.S. at 249.
153. "We are therefore constrained to say that since this Court has said that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause cannot expand Clause 14 so as to include prosecution of civilian
dependents for capital crimes, it cannot expand Clause 14 to include prosecution of them for
noncapital offenses." Id. at 248. Thus, the Singleton holding extends Reid v. Covert to non-
capital crimes. Singleton does not directly control the Tiede case, however. Two obvious
distinguishing factors exist: first, the status of the American military in Berlin differs from
the status of American forces elsewhere in Germany due to the technical occupation that
continues to exist in Berlin; and second, unlike the petitioner in Singleton, Tiede is not a
United States citizen. Although no cases address the issue of citizenship, courts possibly
would be more protective of the right to a trial by an article III court if that right were
asserted by a citizen of the United States. See infra note 181 (discussing the equal protec-
tion considerations that would arise if aliens were denied article III courts).
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hijacking trial to a military court. Although the United States may
continue to deploy troops to West Berlin because of continuing
tension with the Soviet Union,54 civilian courts in Berlin still func-
tion despite this state of political tension.15 5 Under Milligan as
well as Singleton, the threat of armed conflict is not enough of a
basis on which to allow military courts to try civilians. 156
Furthermore, from a policy point of view, the mere presence of
American forces should not be significant. Allowing the President
to set up military tribunals to try civilians wherever American mil-
itary troops reinforce an ally's ability to withstand military and po-
litical pressure would eviscerate the constitutional system of sepa-
ration of powers. It would give the President, who may station
American troops in various locations around the world in response
to saber-rattling and other pressures, free rein over civilian adjudi-
cation in a wide variety of settings. Although the executive branch
needs a significant amount of flexibility to deal with political and
diplomatic pressures and to deploy United States military forces, it
should not have authority to sidestep so easily the constitutional
command that the judicial power of the United States be vested in
an independent judicial branch. Accordingly, the presence of
American military forces in West Berlin as reinforcements for an
ally and as pawns in a Cold War does not release the United States
government from the requirement that article III courts shall exer-
cise the judicial power of the United States.
In sum, the nature of the American relationship with Berlin does
not permit the trial of Tiede in an American military court.
Whether one characterizes the situation as declared war, Cold
154. Because the Cold War was well in progress at the time of the court-martial in Kin-
sella v. Singleton and the Supreme Court forbade a trial by court-martial of the civilian
defendant, the argument that East-West tension justifies a military trial rather than a trial
by jury in an article III court now appears untenable.
155. Not only were the civilian German courts functioning in 1978, see supra note 104,
but the civilian courts in the United States were also functioning. Once the United States
determined to try Tiede, it could have flown Tiede to the United States for trial. The
United States could presumably have exercised jurisdiction over Tiede's hijacking based on
49 U.S.C. § 1472(n) (1982), which makes the offense of air piracy as defined in the Hague
Convention, see supra note 16, punishable by 20 years imprisonment. Federal statutes pro-
vide that "if the [air piracy] offense is committed out of the jurisdiction of any particular
state or district, the trial shall be in the district where the offender. . . is arrested or is first
brought." 49 U.S.C. § 1473(a) (1982).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18, 126, 149-53.
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War, or occupation resulting from war, trying Tiede in a military
rather than a civilian court fails to advance significantly American
military order in Berlin. If the war power justifies Tiede's trial, an-
other rationale for invoking it must be identified.
4. Impact on American Military Forces
The war power analysis of Tiede's trial by an article II court
thus far has focused on the need for military courts as a method of
achieving military order in situations involving conflict and tension
between the United States and other governments. At this point,
an examination of the constitutionality of military trials of civil-
ians from another perspective, the need to maintain a well-disci-
plined and efficient American army, may prove useful. Examined
in this light, Tiede's actions may have had sufficient impact on the
functioning of the American army to warrant trial by a military
tribunal.
Although Tiede did not hijack a military airplane or evince any
military purpose in the hijacking, the circumstances surrounding
Tiede's arrival in West Berlin in 1978 demonstrate that his actions
had some impact on the American military. American military
forces were stationed in Berlin at the time of the hijacking, the
hijacked plane landed at an American military installation, and
American military equipment and personnel would have faced po-
tential injury had the emergency landing failed.
The Polish airliner that Tiede hijacked in August 1978 landed at
an American air base in West Berlin. American military flight con-
trollers guided the jet onto the runway, and American soldiers sur-
rounded the plane when it halted and took Tiede into custody.
One might posit that these circumstances had a sufficient impact
on the American military in Berlin to permit assigning the case to
an American military court. This contention is unsupportable,
however. Although a visible connection existed between the hi-
jacking and the American military installation-the airliner landed
on the American air base-this connection was totally fortuitous.
The hijacker apparently even lacked the intention of landing at a
military airport.157 He did not" give the pilot landing instructions.
157. Stern, supra note 14, at 18.
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Tiede wanted simply to divert the plane from East Germany. The
pilot decided to land on the underutilized air base runways rather
than at the busy commercial airport.15 8 The coincidental relation-
ship between this crime and the American military provides a very
fragile reed on which to base a military trial for the hijacker. With-
out more, it cannot support assigning his criminal trial to a mili-
tary tribunal.
Precedent quite clearly precludes relying on the landing of
Tiede's plane at a United States air base to justify trying Tiede by
a military court. Reid v. Covert 59 and Kinsella v. Singleton'6" are
dispositive. In both cases the Supreme Court forbade military tri-
als of civilians. Both cases involved crimes that occurred on an
American military installation overseas. The victims and the as-
sailants lived in military quarters, and events leading up to the
crimes took place on the military posts. Despite the more substan-
tial connections with the military in Reid and Singleton, the Su-
preme Court held that a military court could not constitutionally
adjudicate the cases. The civilian defendants possessed the right to
trial by an article III American court or to trial by the civilian
courts of the host country.16'
Tiede's hijacking no doubt disrupted military air traffic to some
extent and caused moments of consternation to the military per-
sonnel at Tempelhof Air Base in West Berlin.' 62 Although the
emergency landing caused no one physical injury, the landing did
pose a threat of such injury. Viewing military trials as an instru-
ment of maintaining an efficient and effective American army, one
perhaps could argue that this potential injury to American service-
men was a significant factor in Tiede's offense."6 3
The facts of Reid v. Covert"" also undercut this justification for
a military trial, however. Reid involved more than a potential in-
158. Stern, supra note 14, at 1.
159. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
160. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
161. Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 249; Reid, 354 U.S. at 39.
162. "The sergeant in charge pushed the alarm." Stern, supra note 14, at 1-2.
163. The Polish pilot, the chief prosecution witness, testified that landing the Polish air-
craft at Tempelhof was dangerous because of the length of the runway, the pilot's ignorance
of the airport, and the pilot's lack of data about navigation aids and flight patterns at
Tempelhof. Stern, supra note 14, at 261-63.
164. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
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jury to a member of the American military. In Reid, the victim, a
member of the military, was killed on an American military post
overseas while on active duty in the United States armed forces.
Moreover, the defendant in Reid had an ongoing relationship with
the American military. She was an American serviceman's wife
who had accompanied her husband to his military assignment. The
military literally transported her to England and gave her military
housing there.165 Despite these facts the Supreme Court did not
consider the crime to have enough of an impact on the American
military to warrant a trial by a military court. Instead, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the United States must afford the defend-
ant a trial in an article III court."6 Accordingly, the theoretical
possibility of an injury to American military personnel does not
provide a sufficient constitutional basis for convening an American
military court in Germany in 1979 to try civilians for hijacking a
commercial airliner.
Furthermore, the hijacking caused no tangible injury to Ameri-
can personnel or property. It did not disrupt significant military
operations.6 7 In fact, in light of the contemporary underutilization
of Tempelhof Air Base," 8 no injury to American military interests
was likely. The military impact of this case was therefore utterly
conjectural. Such an ephemeral military impact cannot affect sig-
nificantly the discipline and efficiency of the United States armed
forces. If potential impact justifies military adjudication of civil-
ians, military courts around the world have authority to decide
criminal trials of civilians. With so many members of the American
military stationed overseas, such a result would allow a huge ex-
pansion in the number and types of trials in American military
courts.
Moreover, an approach focusing on injury to American military
personnel might raise questions about adjudication of crimes
against other Americans overseas. To some extent, whenever an
American is the victim of a crime, American interests are in-
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 39. That the defendant in Reid was a United States citizen and Tiede is a
German citizen is not significant. See infra note 181 (discussing constitutional implications
of denial of article III adjudication to aliens).
167. Stern, supra note 14, at 1-2, 26-28.
168. Stern, supra note 14, at 1.
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volved. e69 Therefore, one might argue that American military
courts or similar non-article III tribunals may adjudicate crimes by
civilians against American embassy personnel-or even American
businessmen or tourists. The specter of a vast expansion of Ameri-
can executive branch courts again looms. Allowing the status or
duty assignment of the victim of a crime to determine whether the
accused is afforded a trial in an article III court or a military court
makes a constitutional right too dependent on chance.
One of the factors central to the Supreme Court's analysis in Ex
parte Quirin17 0 was the nature of the offense that the defendants
had committed. The Court emphasized that the defendants were
accused of violating the law of war by engaging in espionage and
sabotage behind enemy lines. 171 After an extensive historical analy-
sis, the Court concluded that the franiers of the Constitution in-
tended that military courts could try such offenses, and that mili-
tary tribunals had heard such trials on a number of occasions
during the first 150 years of United States history.17 2
Nonetheless, the military offense rationale provides no support
for trying Tiede in a military court. Tiede was charged not with
acts of war, but with hijacking, taking a hostage, and carrying a
pistol.173 Although these offenses may occur during times of war,
they have not historically constituted violations of the law of war.
Furthermore, no one alleged that Tiede's offenses possessed any
military significance. The nature of the crimes that Tiede allegedly
committed thus had little, if any, relationship to military order and
169. Of course, the extent of the interest may vary with the nature of the American's
assignment overseas. A foreign government's interference with American diplomats in an
American embassy overseas is likely to threaten more seriously important American inter-
ests than would the arrest of an American tourist overseas.
170. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
171. The defendants in Quirin were charged with: (1) violation of the law of war (includ-
ing, inter alia, engaging in unlawful belligerency by entering enemy territory surreptitiously
and in civilian dress for the purpose of destroying war utilities, war industries, and war
materials); (2) violation of article 81 of the Articles of War, which defines the offense of
relieving or attempting to relieve, or corresponding with or giving intelligence to the enemy;
(3) violation of article 82, which defines the crime of spying; and (4) conspiracy to commit
the offenses alleged in charges 1, 2 and 3. Id. at 15.
172. Id. at 28-30 n.14.
173. Tiede was charged with: (1) hijacking an airplane; (2) taking a hostage (the steward-
ess); (3) depriving the passengers of their liberty; (4) doing bodily harm to another (the
stewardess); and (5) possessing a firearm without a license. Stern, supra note 14, at 59.
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discipline. Tiede's case does not fall within the ambit of the Quirin
holding.
In summary, whether one looks at the location of the crime, the
potential victims, or the nature of the offense, Tiede's acts had
minimal impact on the American military. The facts of Tiede's
case do not support trying him in an American military court as
part of the effort to maintain a well-disciplined and efficient Amer-
ican fighting force. Attempts to justify a military trial of Tiede
based on geopolitical concerns of the 1970's and their impact on
the need for American military order prove similarly unavailing.
The President's war power, therefore, does not provide a constitu-
tional justification for assigning Tiede's case to an American mili-
tary court.
C. A Beirut Scenario
Shifting the focus from Berlin in 1979 to Beirut in 1985 provides
another contemporary perspective on the constitutionality of mili-
tary adjudication of criminal charges against civilians. Although a
United States Court in Beirut may seem less likely than an Ameri-
can court in Berlin, the American military has maintained a pres-
ence in force in Lebanon on more than one occasion.7 4 Because
American military intervention in Lebanon has been sporadic,
however, almost no tradition of American military courts exists in
Lebanon. Yet, the American troops in Beirut from 1983 to 1985
experienced more war-like conditions than did their counterparts
in Berlin. The sound of machine guns and artillery is routine in
Beirut, with armed conflict between bands of militia occurring
daily.17 5 Terrorists destroyed American military barracks in Beirut
174. On July 15, 1958, President Eisenhower ordered U.S. Marines into Lebanon at the
request of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, who feared that Lebanon could not sur-
vive against Moslem rebels allegedly backed by the UAR and USSR. After calm was re-
stored, U.S. troops began their withdrawal on Aug. 12th. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, AN AL-
MANAC 345 (1984).
In 1982, the United States sent 1200 Marines to Lebanon, at the request of the Lebanese
government, as part of a four-nation peace-keeping force. During the 17-month mission,
which ended on February 26, 1984, 262 servicemen lost their lives. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29,
1983, § 1, at 8, col. 3; Id., Aug. 30, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
175. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
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by bombs, 176 and American warships stationed off the coast of Leb-
anon have bombarded selected Lebanese sites.177
If the commander of an American military task force located off
the shores of Lebanon gained custody of the accused hijackers of
the TWA jet, he might be tempted to convene an American mili-
tary court in Beirut to try them. Assigning this trial to a military
court would violate the Constitution, however. Despite the current
military conflict in Beirut, the President's war power fails to justify
establishing military courts there to try civilians. An examination
of the various factors that can justify assigning trials of civilians to
military courts reveals that none supports a military trial in
Beirut. 78
First, Congress has never declared war against Lebanon. 179 The
Lebanese situation in 1985 therefore lacks the legitimacy of mili-
tary action, and its attendant restrictions on civil liberties, that de-
rives from a decision by two branches of the government that war
is necessary. When the United States is not at war, a strong pre-
sumption exists against the suspension of any rights of civilians,
including the right to trial in an article III court.1 80 Moreover, de-
176. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
177. After the destruction of their barracks by a suicide truck bomb, the Marines were
withdrawn from their barracks to warships off shore. Only a few Marines who guard the
United States embassy remain ashore in Beirut now. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, § 1, at 1,
col. 6.
178. Characterizing the hijackers as members of a military force engaged in guerrilla war-
fare against Israel would not lead to a different conclusion. The military status of the ac-
cused may justify trial in an American military court when the accused is a member of the
American military forces. The rationale for criminal trials in non-article III courts in such
instances is that quick and sure adjudication will enforce the discipline among American
soldiers that is necessary to the efficiency and effectiveness of the American military forces.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-08 and infra text accompanying notes 212-14. When
members of another nation's military forces have been tried in American military courts, the
nature of the offense and the existence of actual warfare or imminent threat of invasion, not
the military status of the accused, has been the significant factor. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, grants Congress the power to declare war. When they
decide whether civilians may be tried by a court-martial, some courts have accorded great
significance to whether there has been a formal declaration of war by Congress. E.g., United
States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970) (court-martial of civilian employee
of Army contractor in Vietnam improper in absence of formal declaration of war by
Congress).
180. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). Although the case described
in note 179, supra, was decided on statutory grounds, the court relied heavily on the consti-
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spite the conflict in Lebanon, the American civilian government
still functions and the American courts are open. Furthermore, the
Beirut fighting, albeit grim, poses no threat of imminent danger to
the United States. The hostilities in Beirut, therefore, though real
and capable of endangering American military forces, do not war-
rant assigning criminal trials of civilians to military courts.
Second, the occupation rationale that justified American military
trials of German civilians in the decade after World War II does
not apply in Beirut. The United States armed forces have never
conquered and occupied Lebanon as they did Germany, no one has
attempted to supplant the Lebanese government with an American
occupation government, and American military forces have not
tried to consolidate and protect military objectives while subduing
the civilian population of Lebanon. Thus, no American military
need to establish American occupation courts in order to keep Leb-
anese society functioning has existed.
Third, although American military troops in Lebanon seek to re-
inforce allies and prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the
Middle East, the fact that this aspect of the Cold War has led to a
shooting war does not justify military trials of civilians. As in Ber-
lin, the geopolitical considerations and the East-West conflict pro-
vide an insufficient reason to assign civilian trials to an American
military court. If political tension coupled with gunfire warranted
military trials of civilians, American military tribunals around the
world would be crowded with cases.
Fourth, the hijackers of the American airliner in June 1985 had
little, if any, impact on the American military. The hijackers did
not divert a military plane or land on a military installation, and
the victims of the hijacking were, by and large, civilians. A few pas-
sengers were members of the American armed forces traveling in
civilian clothes to a duty assignment elsewhere in the world. In
fact, one of these men was singled out, apparently because he was
in the military, and murdered. As heinous as this crime was, how-
ever, the victim's military status insufficiently justifies consigning
the murder trial to an American military court. If military courts
tutional analysis in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), and in
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), limiting trials by non-article III courts in
peacetime.
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cannot try civilians accused of murdering an American serviceman
on an American military post overseas, then they may not try the
Beirut hijackers either.181
181. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). In both Reid and the TWA
hijacking, the victims were American servicemen and the accused were civilians. Neither
incident occurred during an American occupation of another country. The situations differ
in two respects, however. First, Reid involved a domestic dispute-a wife killed her hus-
band-whereas the TWA hijacking clearly had a political, if not military, motive. Nothing
in the analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in Reid suggests its holding should be limited
to domestic violence, however. Furthermore, the need for the judicial independence of an
article III court would be even more pressing in a politicized case than in a family dispute.
Second, the defendant in Reid was an American citizen whereas the TWA hijackers prob-
ably are not citizens of the United States. Again, however, little in Reid suggests that its
holding should be limited to American defendants. Certainly, one could make a powerful
equal protection argument if the United States began affording criminal defendants in
American courts fewer rights based on their nationality. Nothing in article III suggests that
its courts are only to be open to citizens. Indeed, article Ill itself, while limiting the jurisdic-
tion that the judicial branch may exercise, expressly extends that jurisdiction to suits in-
volving aliens. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
Furthermore, the policies underlying the judicial independence of article III courts-to
protect against biased adjudication, to protect the courts from pressure exerted by the polit-
ical branches to decide the case in the manner most convenient from a political point of
view, and to protect the ability of the courts to strike down unlawful action taken by the
executive or the legislature-are even more relevant when litigation involves aliens than
when it involves citizens. Aliens are less likely to have powerful interest groups that mobil-
ize on their behalf and exert political pressure to counter the majority's view. Aliens are
more likely to be viewed with suspicion or hostility by the population, so that those whose
jobs depend on responsiveness to the political climate may well be more susceptible to in-
temperate decisions in cases affecting aliens. The need for an article I court rather than an
executive tribunal is particularly great when an alien is accused of a terrible crime and the
atmosphere is highly politicized.
Even more fundamentally, however, the framers devised article III as a restraint on all
federal government action, not just a restraint on action against citizens. When the framers
structured the federal government to embody the separation of powers doctrine they were
attempting to limit the intrusion by one branch into the affairs of another branch. They
were conscious of the potential dangers of a strong central government and attempted to
prevent the executive or legislature from exercising too much power. The political theory
that animated the framers and has guided the United States for 200 years is thwarted if the
executive branch is allowed to run its own courts, particularly when the threat of allowing
political considerations to influence adjudication is so great. Thus, a foreign relations excep-
tion to article III based on suits involving aliens overseas is unsatisfactory. Even if one could
justify affording an alien an article III adjudication in the United States and denying him
one in an identical case overseas, and even if one could ignore the admonition that "all
criminal matters, with the narrow exceptions of military crimes" are at "the protected core
of [the judicial] power" assigned by the framers to the independent article I branch,
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 n.25 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion), one could not allow courts that are dependent on the will of the executive
branch to try cases against civilian aliens overseas without violating the central thrust of the
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Thus, although the United States currently has personnel sta-
tioned in and off the coast of Lebanon, and although an American
military man was killed during the June 1985 hijacking, the Presi-
dent, in the exercise of his war power, cannot establish military
courts overseas to try the Beirut hijackers. If these circumstances
enabled the President to bypass trials in an article III court, he
could assign criminal trials of civilians to military courts wherever
United States military forces are stationed. 18 2 In light of the far-
flung foreign interests of the United States, American military
courts throughout the world could preside over criminal trials
against civilians. The military court exception to article III would
swallow the rule.
D. An Italian Option
The Palestinian hijackers who commandeered an Italian cruise
ship off the coast of Egypt in October 1985 finally relinquished
control of the ship when Egyptian authorities guaranteed them
safe conduct. 8 3 American military planes intercepted the Egyptian
airplane carrying the hijackers away from Egypt, however, and
forced it to land at a military air base in Italy.184 When the plane
landed, a United States military unit quickly surrounded it, intent
on arresting the hijackers who had killed an American passenger. 8 5
Once the hijackers were in American custody, the United States
could have prosecuted them in an American court. Instead, the
American forces withdrew and allowed the Italians to arrest and
imprison the hijackers, while the United States investigated the
possibility of exercising criminal jurisdiction in the case and con-
templated filing a formal request for extradition of the hijackers
and their accomplices. 88 The Italian government, meanwhile,
framers' purpose in assigning the judicial power of the United States to an independent
article III court system.
182. Although one could attempt to limit these situations by arguing that the President
can only assign criminal trials of civilians to military courts where United States military
forces are stationed and active military conflict exists, the broad American presence over-
seas and the frequency with which political disagreements escalate into gunfire would signif-
icantly undermine such a limitation.
183. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
184. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6; id., Oct. 12, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
185. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
186. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
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quickly released the individual believed by the United States to
have masterminded the hijacking.187 While expressing outrage at
the Italian decision to release some of the individuals involved, the
United States continued to seek extradition of the hijackers who
remained in Italian custody so that the United States could prose-
cute them on American charges after the Italian case against them
concluded. 188
In retrospect, President Reagan may well wish that the Ameri-
can soldiers had not relinquished control of the Egyptian airliner
or may wish that the intercepting planes had diverted the Egyp-
tian airliner to an air base controlled solely by American military
forces. Once in American military custody, the Palestinian hijack-
ers and accomplices could have been prosecuted in the first in-
stance under American criminal law. The American trial could
have proceeded overseas, as in Berlin in 1979, or in the United
States.
In light of the diplomatic repercussions of this case, or of similar
cases in the future, convening an American court overseas to try
the hijackers might seem particularly attractive to the President.
The defendants would already be present overseas; threats of fur-
ther interceptions of the flight carrying the hijackers would be
avoided. Additionally, the host country, which would likely have a
stake in the matter, could more easily observe the American pro-
ceedings if they took place overseas. If the host country wished to
proceed against the defendants on different grounds after the
American trial concluded, the United States could easily transfer
custody of the defendants.
Although logistical concerns might make this course desirable,
the President's war power does not justify assigning such a trial to
a military tribunal overseas. The factors that sometimes justify
such assignments fail to support a military trial for the Palestinian
hijackers of the Italian cruise ship.'8 9 First, the United States
187. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6. This individual, Mohammed Abbas, left
Italy for Yugoslavia on October 12. On October 26, 1985, an Italian magistrate issued an
arrest warrant for Mohammed Abbas, the Palestinian leader the United States has accused
of masterminding the cruise ship hijacking. Id., Oct. 29, 1985, at A12, col. 3.
188. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
189. Whether the hijackers are deemed civilians or members of a Palestinian military
force is not significant. See supra note 178.
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clearly has not declared war against the Palestinians. Although
government officials have called for a "war on terrorism," and one
might even argue that American aid to Israel implicates the United
States in the war between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Con-
gress has not voted a declaration of war. Second, the United States
does not occupy Palestinian land and has never attempted to sup-
plant the indigenous government with an American military gov-
ernment. Third, the realpolitik rationale examined and rejected in
analyzing the Berlin and Beirut scenarios has even less validity
here. The cruise ship situation involved no American decision to
send military reinforcements to aid an ally.190 Additionally, the
geopolitical concerns that have led the United States to station
military forces overseas did not trigger the American response to
the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship. Although one can argue
persuasively that punishing and deterring terrorist attacks on
Americans overseas is a legitimate American goal, such a goal does
not justify assigning criminal trials of civilians to military courts.' 9'
Fourth, the hijacking of the cruise ship had little, if any, impact on
American military interests. The crime did not occur on a military
installation, the victim was not a member of the military, and the
nature of the crime had no relation to military order and disci-
pline. Indeed, the only American military involvement occurred af-
ter the crime. The military intervened only to prevent the hijack-
ers from escaping from custody and prosecution. 92
190. The United States armed forces that intercepted the hijackers and the American
troops that surrounded the airplane when it landed in Italy were present pursuant to the
United States' obligations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6. Thus, while they were present in the area as general
reinforcements for Italy, a NATO ally, the decision to station American troops in Italy was
made for political reasons quite different from those underlying the role of American forces
in West Berlin, surrounded on all sides as it is by East Germany. Additionally, the Ameri-
can military's role at the end of the cruise ship hijacking, which occurred in the Mediterra-
nean Sea off the shore of Egypt, was due to the interest of the United States in bringing the
executioners of an American citizen to justice, not to any interest the United States has in
reinforcing its NATO allies.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 226-39.
192. See supra note 190. Although American military intelligence no doubt was involved
in tracking the hijacked cruise ship, and the possibility of using a military special com-
mando unit to end the hijacking may have been considered, these constitute only peripheral
military aspects of the situation.
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E. Limits on the War Power
In sum, the President's war power is not so broad as to justify a
military court system with jurisdiction over civilians based either
on an agreement to station American military forces in an ally's
territory or on a fictional state of war and military occupation. Nor
is this power so expansive as to allow military tribunals to adjudi-
cate cases of civilians charged with crimes that have little, if any,
impact on the military. If the war-making power were so sweeping,
military tribunals could supplant civilian courts, thus vitiating the
framers' separation of powers plan.
Pursuant to his war power, the President can establish military
courts with jurisdiction over civilians in certain limited instances.
War and its immediate aftermath may justify these courts. The
post-war reconstruction of a society also may justify such courts.
Once the war-torn country recovers, however, the continued exis-
tence of these courts becomes constitutionally suspect. Unless a
military prosecution of a civilian relates closely to the maintenance
of military order or to the maintenance of a disciplined and effi-
cient fighting force, the war power of the President does not pro-
vide an adequate basis to permit holding the trial in a military
court.
The hijacking trial of a civilian in the United States Court for
Berlin in 1979 cannot, therefore, be justified. Because of the tenu-
ous connection between the current quartering of American mili-
tary forces in Berlin and the military conflict that spawned the oc-
cupation, the cessation of actual hostilities more than forty years
ago, the complete recovery of the occupied territory since the war,
and the fact that Germany has become a viable independent ally of
the United States, the President could not convene the American
court in Berlin in 1979 to try Tiede based on his war power alone.
If the United States wanted to try Tiede, it should have done so in
an article III court.
Similarly, an American military court could not constitutionally
try the Beirut hijackers. The sporadic American military presence
in Beirut, coupled with the lack of connection between the crime
and the American government's interest in maintaining American
military order and discipline, reveal that the President's war power
does not provide a satisfactory rationale for assigning the hijacking
trial to an American military court in Beirut. In addition, the in-
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sufficient connection between the hijacking of the Italian cruise
ship and the need to maintain American military order and disci-
pline precludes trying those defendants in an American military
court. If the Constitution permits an executive branch tribunal to
adjudicate the criminal prosecutions of the hijacking cases that en-
ded with the hijackers on Berlin, Beirut, or Italian soil, the author-
ity must derive from another source of executive power.
V. EXECUTIVE BRANCH FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS POWER
The Berlin hijacking in 1978, the Beirut hijacking in 1985, and
the October 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship all resulted in
extensive diplomatic maneuvering. Such cases produce a flurry of
activity at the State Department and numerous consultations with
other governments.1 93 In view of these facts, the President's power
to conduct foreign relations may emerge as a basis for authorizing
an executive branch tribunal to adjudicate these hijacking cases.
One can argue that, similar to military courts that the Constitution
permits in certain circumstances in order to maintain military or-
der and discipline, diplomatic or "foreign policy" courts are justi-
fied in situations where they are necessary to assist the President
to carry on foreign relations.
In its recent enumeration of permissible federal courts that lack
article III safeguards, the Marathon opinion listed military courts,
territorial courts, and courts adjudicating public rights. 94 The
opinion did not elevate diplomatic courts to this approved list.
Diplomatic or consular courts do not fit comfortably into any of
these three categories.19 5 Yet in the past American diplomats con-
193. Cf. Stern, supra note 14, at 27-28, 194-95.
194. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plural-
ity opinion). See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
195. Diplomatic courts charged with adjudicating criminal offenses have little in common
with administrative agencies that adjudicate public rights. The subject matter assigned to
these two courts differs dramatically, as does the role of the government in the proceedings
(prosecutor in the former, as opposed to distributor of benefits in the latter). In terms of
subject matter, diplomatic courts are more similar to territorial courts, which do exercise
criminal as well as civil jurisdiction. The rationales justifying the creation of territorial
courts, see supra note 53, do not apply to diplomatic courts, however. For a comparison of
consular courts and military, territorial, and public rights courts, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 227-29.
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vened courts overseas, and, sitting as judges, tried criminal cases
against civilians.196 Precedent, thus, supports the proposition that
in pursuit of his constitutional duty to conduct the foreign rela-
tions of the United States, the President may establish specialized
federal tribunals that do not conform to the requirements of article
III. Without relying on precedent, one may also formulate a related
foreign relations power argument: in the pursuit of his constitu-
tional duty to conduct foreign relations, the President may estab-
lish an executive tribunal to assist the allies of the United States in
the exercise of their own judicial power. Under this second ration-
ale, the President can rely on his foreign relations power to con-
vene an American court overseas so long as the court applies the
host country's-rather than American-judicial power.
The facts of the Berlin, Beirut, and Italian hijackings provide
useful situations in which to analyze whether support exists for
these views of the constitutionality of non-article III diplomatic
courts. Although the United States Court for Berlin grew out of
the occupation court system established in post-war Germany, the
tribunal was more an instrument of the foreign policy of the
United States than an instrument for maintaining military or-
der.1 7 Despite the fact that no one articulated the President's
power to conduct foreign relations as the justification for assigning
the 1979 hijacking trial to the United States Court for Berlin,
American diplomatic concerns played the most important part in
the decision to prosecute Detlef Tiede in an American court.19
From this perspective, the President's power to conduct the for-
eign relations of the United States provided the authority for con-
vening the United States Court for Berlin. 9" As a result, the court
does not violate article III unless this alternative rationale for an
article III exception is also unfounded.
196. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); see also infra text accompanying notes 201-
05.
197. By 1955, when the United States Court for Berlin was established, the occupied pop-
ulation was not hostile to the United States. Key German institutions were functioning. See
supra notes 103-04. The East-West confrontation, however, was already underway. See
supra notes 144, 146-47.
198. The diplomatic maneuverings were intense, and military considerations were never
raised. Stern, supra note 14, at 27-28, 194-95.
199. See supra note 56.
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Similarly, diplomatic concerns about ensuring the safety of
American citizens and property overseas and about the enforce-
ment of international treaties against air piracy will play a signifi-
cant role if the United States obtains custody of the Beirut hijack-
ers. Hijackings are fraught with foreign policy implications. The
angry responses of the Egyptian and Italian governments to the
American interception of the cruise ship hijackers demonstrated
the heightened diplomatic concerns that can arise in hijacking situ-
ations. One can argue that foreign policy concerns justify conven-
ing an article II diplomatic court in Beirut and in Italy to try the
hijackers that landed there, just as these concerns may have justi-
fied assigning the Tiede trial to the United States Court for Berlin.
The extensive diplomatic maneuvering triggered by all three
hijackings supports such an assertion, as does the American judici-
ary's traditional deference to executive action in matters concern-
ing foreign policy. To decide whether the Constitution permits
criminal trials to be assigned to diplomatic courts in situations
such as these, fraught as they are with foreign policy implications,
one must analyze whether the separation of powers doctrine and
its requirement of judicial independence square with executive
"foreign policy courts" overseas.
A. American Diplomatic Courts: An Historical Overview
Historical support exists for American tribunals established as
an incident to the President's power to carry on foreign relations
with other nations. Consular courts, in disuse now, once were a
normal part of diplomatic missions in foreign countries.200 Ameri-
can diplomatic personnel who lacked life tenure presided over
these courts.20' On occasion diplomatic courts even handled serious
criminal cases. Indeed, in the most famous consular court case, In
200. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462 (1891); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11-
12 (1957) (plurality opinion). Consular courts, which exercised criminal jurisdiction over
U.S. citizens, were at one time or another provided for in treaties with Japan, Borneo, Mad-
agascar, the Samoan Islands, Korea, the Tonga Islands, Tripoli, Persia, the Congo, Ethiopia,
Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Muscat. Reid, 354 U.S. at 61-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
201. Diplomatic personnel serve at the will of the President. Approximately two-thirds of
United States ambassadors are career foreign service officers, while the other one-third are
"political" appointees. None has life tenure. See generally CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CON-
TROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 33-70 (1917, reprinted 1970).
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re Ross,20 2 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
murder conviction of a seaman tried by the American consul in
Yokohama, Japan. The defendant, who alleged British citizenship,
challenged the constitutionality of the consular court. Finding that
the defendant served aboard an American ship and that the homi-
cide occurred while the ship lay anchored in Yokohama harbor, the
Supreme Court ruled that the consular court had the power to try
the case.2 °s
In Ross the Court emphasized the diplomatic aspects of consular
courts. It first examined the treaties between the United States
and Japan to discover if the treaties granted jurisdiction over this
type of case to the American court. After concluding that the trea-
ties in force provided jurisdiction,0 4 the Court recounted the his-
torical background of consular courts. It described these courts as
an attempt by the United States to protect Americans overseas
and viewed consular courts as a means of providing Americans ac-
cused of crimes with a modicum of procedural regularity that the
legal systems of the host country might lack or deny to Americans
and other foreigners. 20 5 The Court neither acknowledged nor ana-
lyzed any threat that consular courts posed to the separation of
202. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
203. Id. at 464-65.
204. Id. at 465. The Treaty of June 17, 1857, between Japan and the'United States gave
the American consul in Japan the authority to try Americans committing offenses in that
country and to punish them according to American laws. The Treaty with Japan of July 29,
1858, granted a slightly different judicial authority to American consular courts. It gave
them jurisdiction to try Americans charged with committing offenses against Japanese and
to hear claims of Japanese creditors seeking to recover against American citizens. Because
the Treaty of 1858 incorporated those provisions of the 1857 treaty that were not in conflict
with it, the United States consular courts in Japan continued to exercise jurisdiction over
Americans who committed offenses against other Americans, as well as against Japanese. Id.
at 465-67.
205. American consular courts were established in countries whose legal systems were
considered so inferior to that of the United States that American citizens could not obtain
justice in them. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 64 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result). Consular courts had their genesis in the period preceding the Middle Ages when
European governments, seeking to protect their subjects living abroad from harsh treatment
by the tribunals of non-Christian countries, sent officers to those countries to exercise lim-
ited jurisdiction over their subjects, to watch out for their interests, and to assist them in
adjudicating their disputes. Fear of unequal treatment abroad, of cruel and barbaric punish-
ment, and of the use of torture to elicit confessions fueled the desire to attain consular
jurisdiction. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462-63 (1891).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:1
powers doctrine. Nor did it examine the possibility that the Ameri-
can consular court exercised the judicial power of the host country.
Although the existence of consular courts and the Ross opinion
provide historical support for a foreign relations exception to arti-
cle III, this support is weaker than the historical support for the
military court exception to article III discussed earlier.06 Unlike
consular courts, military courts have existed throughout the his-
tory of the United States and continue in active use. Moreover,
although later decisions undermined the Ross opinion,207 courts
continue to uphold the constitutionality of military tribunals.i
08
Marathon's review of constitutional non-article III American
courts contained a prominent discussion and analysis of military
courts, 09 yet it only mentioned consular courts in a footnote.2 10 In
its analysis of the three approved categories of non-article III
courts,211 Marathon provides little support.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 60-105.
207. In recent years, the Supreme Court has retreated from the Ross opinion. More recent
opinions have required greater procedural safeguards thaf provided in Ross for Americans
tried in American courts overseas, and have criticized the Ross opinion's benighted views of
foreign lands. E.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). Although not over-
ruling Ross, the plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert described the reasoning in Ross as rest-
ing in part "on a fundamental misconception." Id. at 12. A more basic constitutional weak-
ness in Ross than its distrust of foreign judicial proceedings, however, is its failure to
consider the violence done to the separation of powers principle when cases with foreign
relations implications can be routed away from the independent federal judiciary and into a
system of executive tribunals.
Ross was also based on the premise that the United States Constitution has no extraterri-
torial effect, and therefore does not restrain American government action abroad. In re
Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). Although the extraterritorial effect of the United States
Constitution is a complicated issue that is still hotly disputed, few would argue today that
American officials abroad are totally unrestrained by the Constitution. See generally Hen-
kin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at our
Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11 (1985).
To illustrate the point, imagine that the American military authorities at the air base in
Berlin had decided on the day Tiede arrived that he was guilty of hijacking, had told him
that he would be incarcerated for 15 years, and had immediately confined him in a jail cell
on the air base. Tiede's petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the American
officials had violated due process by sentencing him to prison without a judicial hearing
would almost certainly have to be granted.
208. E.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
209. 458 U.S. 50, 66 (1982) (plurality opinion).
210. Id. at 65 n.16.
211. Id. at 63-70.
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B. Diplomatic Courts: Specialized Needs
1. Pragmatic Considerations in the Past
In each of the three article III exceptions recognized in Mara-
thon, history demonstrated a genuine need for assigning adjudica-
tion to non-article III tribunals. An examination of the require-
ments that gave rise to the executive and legislative tribunals
sanctioned by Marathon and a comparison of those conditions
with the exigencies that might give rise to a non-article Ill diplo-
matic court prove useful. Courts-martial perhaps show best the
type of specialized needs that in the past have justified the crea-
tion of federal courts outside article III. Military forces require dis-
cipline and often require swift administration of that discipline.2 12
A scheme that withheld discipline from military forces until an ar-
ticle III court could convene and rule on the case would impede
the swift disposition of military cases. Furthermore, for the good of
the morale and efficiency of the officer corps, fellow officers famil-
iar with military needs and problems, not civilians independent
and aloof from military life, must check attempts to impose disci-
pline.213 Allowing civilians to second-guess military discipline
might seriously undermine the obedience necessary to a fighting
force. In addition, the person imposing discipline and the person
disciplined are more likely to have a continuing relationship in
military cases than in civilian cases. The officer bringing the charge
and the soldier charged likely will continue working with each
other every day until the resolution of the charge. If the charge
required adjudication by a slower article III decision-maker rather
than by the more expeditious court-martial system, the underwing
dispute would often poison the daily routine for a significant
length of time; clearly an undesirable result. Accordingly, the mili-
tary's need for speedy decisions by a tribunal familiar with the
military situation in which the dispute arose justifies the decision
by Congress and the President to establish military tribunals
rather than article III courts in certain situations.21 4
212. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1957) (plurality opinion) (describing need for
special courts in the armed services).
213. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955).
214. The President's power to establish military tribunals derives from his authority as
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Congress, pursuant to
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Territorial courts also present a specialized need for adjudication
outside article III courts. Territorial courts grew up when the
United States occupied only a stretch of the eastern seaboard of
North America.215 Even then, however, the country's power ex-
tended beyond its borders. The United States controlled, as terri-
tories, extensive land on the North American continent. In these
territories, by definition beyond the states, no state government
existed. The apparatus established by the federal authorities pro-
vided the only government.216 The federal authorities decided that
a need existed in the territories for a judicial forum to resolve dis-
putes. The government therefore established territorial courts. Be-
cause the local government was solely federal, the territorial courts
handled both local and national adjudication.217
Judges without life tenure staffed the territorial courts. These
judges did not possess article III's life tenure and protection
against salary reduction for two reasons. First, as horse-drawn
transportation was the fastest method available, it took an enor-
mous amount of time to travel from the nation's capital to the ter-
ritories. Due to the long travel time, many believed that the terri-
tories did not need article III protections because no realistic
danger existed that members of the federal legislative or executive
branches would pressure territorial judges.21s Second, the territo-
rial judges lacked life tenure because many believed that most of
the territories would eventually become states. Once state govern-
ments began operating, state courts would hear local disputes.
Federal courts would continue to hear matters of federal law, but
they would constitute only a small portion of the case load for-
its constitutional authority "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, enacted in 1950 the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 801-940 (1982), which defines the jurisdiction of military tribunals and grants the Presi-
dent broad discretion to establish rules governing them.
215. The Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of territorial courts in 1828.
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
216. Cf. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (stating that Congress shall have power to make all
necessary rules and regulations respecting territory or other property of the United States).
217. See e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545 n.14 (1962) (plurality opinion).
218. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 546.
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merly assigned to the territorial courts.21 e Thus, if Congress estab-
lished article III territorial courts, as the territories became states
and the need for federal adjudication diminished, the federal gov-
ernment would inherit a large number of superfluous federal
judges with life tenure but little work to do.220
Federal courts adjudicating public rights, popularly known as
administrative agencies, present still different needs for specialized
adjudication outside article III courts.221 The judges of these courts
are selected for and are expected to have expertise in the work
done by a particular agency.222 Unlike article III judges, they are
not generalists expected to handle all sorts of criminal cases as well
as the infinite variety of civil cases created by statute and known
to common law. Furthermore, administrative agencies developed as
experiments designed to yield more efficient methods of running
the federal government in a highly complex, fast-changing world.223
If all administrative law judges possessed life tenure, this would
limit future congressional attempts to reorganize or experiment
with different models of agency adjudication.224 Also, the huge
growth in the administrative agency arm of the federal government
mitigates against giving these courts article III status. The addi-
tion of 2,000 specialized article III judges would swell the judicial
branch enormously and change its character significantly. 225
219. Id. at 545-46. No general grant of federal question jurisdiction to the federal district
courts existed until 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. See C. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 90 (4th ed. 1983).
220. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-46 (1962) (plurality opinion).
221. The public rights doctrine applies to matters arising "between the government and
persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional
functions of the executive or legislative departments." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50
(1932). The power of Congress to create legislative courts in public rights cases authorizes
Congress to create administrative agencies to regulate and adjudicate public rights matters.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 n.18 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion).
222. See B. MEZINES, J. STEIN, & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 5.02 (revised 1986).
223. Id. at § 1.01[3]. See also K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 18-24 (2d ed.
1978).
224. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 118
(1982) (White, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
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2. Pragmatic Considerations Overseas
As happened in Berlin in 1978-and could have happened in
Beirut or Italy in 1985-Americans stationed overseas occasionally
find themselves with custody of civilians charged with committing
crimes overseas. Usually when this happens, the United States
quickly delivers the individuals to the police force of the host
country and American involvement ends. Only in rare cases-like
Tiede in Berlin-does the United States maintain custody and
contemplate convening an American court to adjudicate the mat-
ter. In deciding how to proceed in these rare cases, the United
States faces three possibilities: it can ask the host country to try
the case, it can convene an executive branch court, or it can assign
the case to an article III court. The United States normally follows
the first option, which raises no article III problem because it does
not involve the judicial power of the United States. Obviously no
article III problem exists in the third option either, although prac-
tical difficulties may exist with moving the defendant to an article
III court or moving an article III court to the defendant. The sec-
ond option, which may involve fewer practical difficulties, on its
face violates article III.
In light of the recognized exceptions to article III, however, com-
pelling foreign policy needs theoretically could permit a trial in a
diplomatic tribunal rather than in an article III court. The needs
that gave rise to the constitutionally approved non-article III court
systems provide a useful starting point for analyzing the constitu-
tionality of diplomatic courts. In addition to the factors that have
justified the military, territorial, and administrative agency excep-
tions to article III-speed of discipline, morale, continuing rela-
tionship, lack of available courts, distance, superfluous life-tenured
judges, expertise, and transformation of the federal judici-
ary-needs peculiar to the world of diplomacy may also exist.
Preventing difficulties or embarrassment to an ally or appeasing an
adversary, both legitimate diplomatic concerns, may lend some
diplomatic urgency to thoughts of convening an American tribunal
overseas. Analysis of each of these factors in light of the realities of
twentieth century American life should reveal whether any consti-
tutional justification exists for allowing an American diplomatic
court overseas to try civilians on criminal charges that arose there.
[Vol. 28:1
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Before examining each of the relevant factors, two fundamental
points deserve mentioning.
Convening a "diplomatic" court within the United States to try
criminal charges clearly violates the Constitution. If Tiede had
been brought to the United States for trial in 1979-or if those
accused of hijacking the TWA airplane to Beirut or the Italian
cruise ship were extradited to the United States-the criminal tri-
als would have to take place before an article III court.226 American
diplomatic courts could therefore only handle trials overseas. Re-
stricting diplomatic courts to overseas trials would not suffice to
pass constitutional muster, however. The crimes forming the basis
226. The idea that the government can, based on potential diplomatic repercussions, as-
sign criminal cases against civilians in the United States to an executive branch tribunal
rather than to an article III court is so untenable that extended discussion is unwarranted.
In these diplomatically sensitive criminal cases, the potential for political interference with
adjudication by an executive tribunal would be so great, and the possible consequences to
the defendant so severe, that all three goals behind the framers' creation of an independent
judicial branch would be thwarted: there would be no guarantee of impartial adjudication,
no significant ability of the court to check unconstitutional actions by the executive branch,
and no method to assure that the Executive did not effectively pressure the court into ruling
in accordance with the Executive's wishes.
Although Congress has not generally granted jurisdiction over offenses committed beyond
the borders of the United States to article III courts, Congress has always allowed certain
crimes committed outside the country to be tried in the United States. E.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 113, 114, 661, 662, 1111, 1113, 2111 (1982) (within maritime jurisdiction of the United
States); 18 U.S.C. § 1116(c) (1982) (murder or manslaughter of internationally protected
persons wherever killed). Federal courts have upheld trials in the United States for crimes
committed abroad involving delivery of confidential United States information, United
States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980) (defend-
ant violated 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1982) by delivering top-secret material to a Soviet agent in
Greece); involving bribery and conspiracy to defraud the United States, Harlow v. United
States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962) (defendant violated 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1982) by soliciting bribes and kickbacks from vendors to military facilities
overseas and deposited bribery payments in Swiss bank accounts); and involving conspiracy
to defraud a corporation in which the United States is a stockholder, United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (defendants conspired while on the high seas on a ship owned by
the United States to obtain false payments for the delivery of fuel oil).
By enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1982), which provides for venue in the United States for
offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of a state, Con-
gress contemplated that certain crimes that occurred beyond the borders of the United
States could be tried in the United States. Recently, Congress made hijacking an American
plane anywhere abroad or harming Americans in an act of hijacking a federal offense. 18
U.S.C. § 32 (current version of 18 U.S.CA § 32 (West Supp. 1986); 49 U.S.C. § 1472. Under
these new statutes, many more crimes committed outside the United States can be tried
within the United States by article III courts.
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of the prosecution must also have occurred overseas. Trying a de-
fendant charged with committing a federal crime in the United
States in an American court overseas merely because he was appre-
hended overseas violates the Constitution. If the federal govern-
ment must afford an article III tribunal to a defendant accused of
committing an offense in the United States when it catches him in
New York, it cannot ignore article III and set up an executive
court for the trial simply because the defendant managed to elude
detection and leave the United States.
These obvious restrictions on diplomatic courts do not invalidate
Tiede's trial, however. His trial, like the consular trials in the past,
took place in an American court outside the United States for of-
fenses that occurred beyond the borders of the United States. Sim-
ilarly, the Beirut and cruise ship hijackings occurred beyond the
territory of the United States.
Restricting American diplomatic courts to overseas trials for
overseas crimes, while it reduces the instances in which such courts
will be authorized, does not necessarily make these courts a consti-
tutionally permissible exception to article III. A comparison of dip-
lomatic courts with military courts, territorial courts, and agency
adjudication is illuminating, but does not bode well for diplomatic
courts. The factors that justify military courts provide no support
for concluding that assigning criminal trials to diplomatic courts is
constitutional. The speed with which the court can try the accused
is much less critical in a criminal case assigned to an executive
branch court overseas than it is in a military setting. Although the
speedy disposition of criminal charges is always desirable,227 the
civilian context lacks the exigencies of military life that require
quick resolution of military charges. The diplomatic exception also
differs from the military exception in another important regard.
Little if any disruption of the functioning of the diplomatic corps
overseas would result if a defendant were flown to the United
States for trial, whereas tremendous disruption would occur if
every soldier accused of an offense against military law were sepa-
227. In order to assure speedy disposition of criminal charges, Congress has enacted the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982), which requires an indictment or informa-
tion to be filed within 30 days of arrest, § 3161(b), and a trial to begin within 70 days of the
filing of the indictment or information, § 3161(c)(1).
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rated from his unit and delivered to an article III court for trial.
Additionally, the morale of the diplomatic corps will likely not
play a role in "foreign relations" cases. Unlike military officers,
diplomats do not view enforcing discipline and punishing crime as
a central part of their duties. Thus, they should not resent the as-
signment of criminal cases to independent decision-makers re-
moved from the daily routine of the diplomatic corps. Also, al-
though a continuing relationship likely will exist between the
parties involved in the military cases, such a relationship is un-
likely in criminal cases in consular courts overseas. A diplomat
judge would probably not have any dealings with the defendant
other than those in the trial. Therefore, there is little justification
for having a diplomat instead of an article III judge resolve the
problem.
Nor do the needs that gave rise to the territorial courts justify
assigning criminal cases today to diplomatic courts overseas. The
territorial courts were a nineteenth century creation. The difficulty
and slowness of travel precluded transporting litigants and wit-
nesses back to the states where they could be tried by article III
federal courts, but the ease and speed of modern communications
and transportation have changed that. The United States can de-
liver the defendant and witnesses to an article III court in the
United States in less than twenty-four hours from practically any-
where in the world. This ability strongly argues against any practi-
cal necessity to try the defendant overseas.
Furthermore, the territorial courts were created in areas where
there were no alternative tribunals; the federal government pro-
vided the only courts available. This is generally not the case over-
seas today. The courts of the host country are almost always open
to try criminal offenses that occur within their borders. In addi-
tion, diplomatic courts do not face the problem of appointing life-
tenured judges to a large number of courts that likely will vanish
in the near future. The American foreign service stations abroad
will probably not experience significant reduction in the foresee-
able future. Thus, if article III judges were appointed to adjudicate
criminal matters that arose in American diplomatic outposts over-
seas, the specter of large numbers of life-tenured article III judges
without a docket would be most unlikely.
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Similarly, the expertise rationale does not justify convening con-
sular courts to adjudicate criminal offenses. Diplomatic personnel
probably have not developed expertise in either criminal law or in
running a courtroom. Adjudication is not a major function of the
foreign service. No advantage exists, therefore, in consigning crimi-
nal trials to the diplomatic corps or their surrogates rather than to
article III judges.22 8 Because the consular courts in the past, and
those suggested for the future, have convened to try criminal cases,
which form a significant part of the federal district court docket,229
requiring article III judges to staff diplomatic courts would not
change the character of the judiciary by means of a vast infusion of
specialists. Thus, the rationales that undergird the public rights
exception to article III do not support a diplomatic court exception
any more than do the needs that gave rise to military and territo-
rial courts.
That the specific needs giving rise to the three exceptions recog-
nized in Marathon do not apply to diplomatic courts does not pre-
clude the possibility of other imperatives that might justify a
fourth exception to article III. Marathon's caution that exceptions
to article III must be narrowly formulated, 23 0 however, mandates
that any rationales proffered to support diplomatic courts overseas
be given careful scrutiny. One such rationale could be based on the
desire of the United States to increase the stability of its allies. As
the 1978 hijacking in Berlin and the 1985 hijackings of the airplane
in Beirut and the cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea illustrate,
situations may occur in which an ally presses the United States to
convene an American court overseas to hear a criminal case. The
228. Situations may arise-Ambassador Mike Mansfield in Japan comes to mind-in
which the American consular officer's expertise with the host country's culture is helpful.
Michael J. Mansfield, former Majority Leader of the Senate (1961-1976) was appointed Am-
bassador to Japan in 1977. THE INTERNATIONAL WHO'S WHO, 1984-85, at 916 (48th ed., 1984).
For example, a consular officer may be familiar enough with the society that he can take
judicial notice of aspects of the culture where the crime occurred and the defendant perhaps
lived. Nonetheless, this familiarity should not be crucial. If the defendant is allowed to
make a full record, he can educate the judge about all that is necessary to understand the
case.
229. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 178-79 (1985).
230. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
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ally may fear internal political protest if it tries the case itself or
may fear external protest from other nations about the trial.
While helping an ally by trying the accused in an American
court may be a legitimate goal of American foreign policy, trying
the case in an article III court would achieve this goal just as easily
as would trial by a consular court. If the ally demands a trial by a
consular court, rather than by an article III court, the desire to
please an ally should not allow the United States government to
ignore article III. Although another country might have a genuine
interest in having an American court handle the case, it is difficult
to grant that the country's desire for a consular court in particular
should rise to the level of previously recognized article HI excep-
tions. The only real advantage to the ally of having the case tried
by an executive branch tribunal rather than by an article III court
is that the diplomatic court, unprotected by life tenure, might ac-
cept orders-or succumb to pressure-to impose a conviction.
Under this rationale of appeasing an ally, the United States might
just as well incarcerate the defendant without the charade of a
trial.231 Fortunately, neither article III nor the due process clause
of the Constitution permits such a procedure.
One might argue that at times it is better American foreign pol-
icy to sacrifice a defendant than to have an ally overthrown or to
face war over the incident, and that accordingly in such situations
a diplomatic court should be convened to assure a conviction. One
might attempt to bolster this argument by pointing to the high
rate of convictions in courts-martial and arguing that courts-mar-
tial exist, by and large, to assure convictions as a method of enforc-
ing the discipline necessary in an army.2 32 Such a view must be
rejected. Many have expressed doubts about the impartiality of
231. This example highlights the interrelationship of the judicial independence require-
ments of article III and the due process clause. Although due process analysis focuses on the
rights of individuals vis-o-vis the government in contrast to the structural approach of arti-
cle III which focuses on the role of the judicial branch vis-h-vis the executive and legislative
branches, both share a fundamental commitment to a process of impartial adjudication.
While the framers imposed the judicial independence requirements of article III on the
courts in an attempt to compartmentalize and balance government power, they believed
that fairer government decision making would be one of the primary benefits of a compart-
mentalized national government. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
232. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969).
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courts-martial,233 but the perceived lack of impartiality has been
deemed a problem with courts-martial rather than a justification
for them. In fact, concerns about lack of impartiality have made
contemporary society quite hesitant about military courts and have
led the Supreme Court to circumscribe greatly their jurisdiction. 4
Military courts aside, if an ally will fall or war will break out unless
the United States tries a defendant, the solution is to try him in an
article III court. More to the heart of the issue, if an ally will fall or
war will break out unless the United States convicts a defend-
ant-and therefore an article II court is preferable because the ex-
ecutive branch both prosecutes and adjudicates-then the ally de-
mands in fact that no real trial take place. The diplomatic stakes
in this scenario are high, but the constitutional requirement of ju-
dicial independence ensures impartial decision making in just such
politicized situations as this.
In light of the relatively scant historical support for non-article
Ill diplomatic courts, the relative ease with which overseas defend-
ants can be brought before an article III court in the United States
today, and the constitutional presumption that article III courts
adjudicate criminal charges against civilians, the executive branch
must not convene non-article III courts overseas to try hijacking
cases. Accordingly, other trial altenatives must be considered.
3. Alternatives to Executive Branch Courts
If the defendant and crucial witnesses can come to the United
States, the trial should proceed in an article III court.235 Admit-
tedly, transporting the defendant away from the scene of the crime
may raise some practical difficulties, but they are not insurmounta-
ble. For example, in the Tiede case most of the prosecution wit-
233. Id. at 264; United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955).
234. E.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969); United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955).
235. Venue in the United States for crimes committed beyond the borders of the United
States is permitted by the Constitution and by statute. "The trial ... shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within
any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
"The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the
jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender
is arrested or first brought. ... 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1982).
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nesses had to be flown from Poland to West Berlin. They could
have been flown relatively easily to the United States instead. The
United States could also have easily transported other witnesses,
the American military at the air base in Berlin and Ingrid Ruske,
who accompanied Tiede to West Berlin, to the United States. In
the Beirut case, most of the witnesses-the passengers and the
crew of the hijacked plane-already live in the United States.
Others, such as the air traffic controllers and the diplomats in the
various countries involved in the plane's odyssey, would have to be
flown to the site of the trial whether it be Beirut or Washington,
D.C. Similarly, many of the witnesses to the cruise ship hijacking
are scattered in countries around the Mediterranean as well as in
North America. Whether the trial took place in Italy or the United
States, witnesses would have to be gathered and flown to the cho-
sen site.
Despite the relative ease of air transportation, trying a defend-
ant in the United States for crimes committed overseas would raise
problems. The subpoena power of the court might not reach im-
portant witnesses, and the defendant might legitimately claim that
lack of witnesses hampered him in presenting his defense. More-
over, situations may arise in which the host country will not allow
the United States to remove a defendant and fly him back to the
United States for trial in an article III court.23 6 If trial in the
United States becomes difficult or impossible, the United States
has two choices: allow the host country to try the defendant or
authorize an article III court to act overseas to try the case. Al-
though article III courts currently lack jurisdiction to sit overseas
and try criminal cases that arise in another country, Congress
could expand article III jurisdiction to allow trials overseas of indi-
viduals charged with violations of United States criminal stat-
utes.2 37 Article III judges could travel overseas quickly enough to
236. This was the case in Italy in October 1985. See supra text accompanying notes 183-
88.
237. Currently, the statutory grants of criminal jurisdiction to federal courts over crimes
occurring beyond American borders are limited to fairly narrow circumstances, see supra
note 226. Article III places no geographical limitations on the location of federal district
courts, however. See supra note 57.
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ensure that defendants receive a speedy trial.238
If an American criminal hijacking trial takes place overseas,
therefore, it should-and could-proceed in an article III court.
Nonetheless, practical problems of court administration would
weigh against setting up an American court overseas. Unless the
court were located in West Berlin, or some area with a similarly
unique relationship to the United States, relatively straightforward
matters such as enforcing subpoenas might prove extremely diffi-
cult. Of course, similar obstacles also would encumber any type of
American court established in another country. Although these
practical difficulties bear on the wisdom rather than the constitu-
tionality of establishing article III courts overseas, they are strong
reasons not to convene American courts to adjudicate offenses
committed by civilians beyond the borders of the United States.
Rather, the United States should allow the host country, which has
primary jurisdiction over offenses committed within its borders,23 9
to try those cases.
238. For example, Stern easily and quickly flew to Berlin to convene the court and adjudi-
cate Tiede's case. See Stern, supra note 14, at 55, 94.
239. The North Atlantic Treaty Regarding Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, 4
U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, provides that the sending country has the
right to exercise in the host country criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction under the law of
the sending country over persons subject to the military law of the sending country; that the
host country has the right to exercise jurisdiction over military and civilian personnel from
the sending country for violations within the host country of the host country's law; that the
sending country has the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the
sending country's military law for offenses punishable under the law of the sending country,
but not punishable under the law of the host country; that the host country has the right to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable under the law of the host country,
but not punishable under the law of the sending country; that when there is concurrent
jurisdiction the sending country has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over the send-
ing country's armed forces or accompanying civilian components when the offense is solely
against the property or security of the sending country, or solely against the property or
person of another of the sending country's armed forces or accompanying civilian compo-
nents, or when the offense arises out of an act or omission done in the performance of offi-
cial duty; that in all other instances of concurrent jurisdiction the host country has primary
jurisdiction. The country with the primary jurisdiction shall give "sympathetic considera-
tion" to a request from the other country that it waive its right to exercise jurisdiction. Art.
VII (3)(c).
Under the Hague Convention, supra note 16, the United States, West Germany, Poland,
and possibly East Germany had concurrent jurisdiction over the Tiede hijacking. The Con-
vention contains no provisions for establishing priorities. In drafting the Convention, the
United States had favored giving primary jurisdiction to the country where the aircraft was
registered. S. AGRAWALA, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (1973).
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In sum, the exigencies that justify the military, territorial, and
public rights exceptions to article III do not support the creation
of diplomatic courts overseas to try criminal charges. Nor do any
American foreign policy interests override the requirement for an
article III court and warrant assigning criminal cases to article II
courts. When an American court convenes overseas to exercise the
judicial power of the United States, therefore, it must meet the
requirements of article III. In most cases, however, the courts of
the host country should try crimes committed by civilians overseas.
C. Diplomatic Courts: An Exercise of Foreign Judicial Power
Although it was not articulated as a basis for convening the
United States Court for Berlin in 1978, one can argue that the ex-
ecutive power to conduct foreign relations allows the President to
convene an executive branch tribunal overseas in order to help an
ally exercise its judicial power.2 40 This view rests on two premises:
240. A few hypotheticals illustrate the foreign judicial power analysis. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the government of the Philippines, deciding that its own judicial system was seri-
ously compromised or at least unable to provide the appearance of independence and impar-
tiality, asked the United States to set up an American tribunal in Manila to try those
accused of the Aquino assassination. The President agreed and appointed the American
ambassador to the Philippines to serve as the judge of that tribunal. The ambassador/judge,
serving in both positions at the will of the President, conducted a trial using American trial
procedure and Philippine criminal law. The judge found the defendants guilty and sen-
tenced them to death. Because the government of the Philippines has the legal authority to
decide whether to enforce the American court's judgment, this proceeding could be consid-
ered an exercise of Philippine judicial power by its American ally. If the Philippine govern-
ment decided to release the defendants and expunge the convictions, the American govern-
ment's only legal recourse would be a diplomatic protest, or perhaps an effort to exert
diplomatic pressure on the Philippines to honor the decisions issued by the American tribu-
nal. Because the United States tribunal's decision would be, in the end, only advisory, the
court arguably exercised Philippine rather than American judicial power. Consequently, the
judicial independence requirements of article III would not be activated.
To take an example closer to home, suppose the United States by treaty agreed to con-
vene an American court to exercise an ally's judicial power in certain enumerated situations,
such as political assassinations, hijacking, and gun-running. Mexico, a signatory to the
treaty, decided that gun-running from Mexico to Central American countries had gotten out
of hand. Invoking the treaty, the Mexican government asked the United States to help sta-
bilize the situation by providing courts to try the Mexican gun-running cases. The United
States, seriously cQncerned about the problem and aware of the severe backlog of criminal
cases in Mexican courts, agreed to have American consular officers in Mexico set up tribu-
nals and try the criminal charges of gun-running. Although staffed by executive branch offi-
cials who lack life tenure, the consular courts observed the fundamentals of due process:
notice, opportunity to be heard, and impartial decision making. Under the foreign judicial
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first, that American courts overseas can be authorized to exercise
the judicial power of another country, and second, that determin-
ing whether an American court overseas exercises American judi-
cial power or foreign judicial power is possible. If these premises
are correct, article III may not pose an obstacle to the creation of
these executive courts. By its terms article III limits only the judi-
cial power of the United States.24' If the power exercised by an
American tribunal is not the judicial power of the United States,
the policies underlying article III are not thwarted by a tribunal
that lacks the article III safeguards of judicial independence.
Although little precedent exists to support it, logic indicates that
the first premise is correct. At first glance, this premise appears to
contradict the maxim that one sovereign may not exercise the pe-
nal law of another sovereign.242 This proposition does not apply to
power analysis, this scenario would not violate article III. American tribunals that do not
exercise the judicial power of the United States do not need the article III attributes of
judicial independence. Because the government of Mexico is legally the sovereign and thus
makes the ultimate decision to enforce the judgment, the consular courts could be said to
exercise Mexican judicial power.
The principles undergirding the separation of powers doctrine expose a serious flaw in the
foreign judicial power rationale. See infra text accompanying notes 250-253. This rationale
would allow courts subject to pressure from the political branches of government to try
cases in a number of situations that appear to warrant trial by an independent judicial
branch. For example, a United States citizen on trial in a consular court for gun-running
could persuasively argue that he is entitled to a trial in an article III court. He could argue
that the risk of political pressure on the American fact finder would be great. The consular
officer would have an incentive to please the Mexican authorities, with whom he must work
on a number of issues. Tn addition, the American diplomatic officers might feel compelled to
set a good image in order to encourage other Central American countries to crack down on
gun-running. Therefore, the article III guarantees of judicial independence, which were
designed to prevent the political branches of the federal government from unfairly influenc-
ing federal adjudication, are warranted in this situation. To retort that the United States
Constitution does not guarantee American citizens arrested by a foreign government article
III trials, no matter how politicized the situation, is unsatisfactory in light of article III's
goal of an independent American judiciary. In the hypothetical, after all, American officials
convene the consular courts and sit as judges, and American tribunals are susceptible to the
pressure of the political branches of the American government.
241. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
242. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1947) (rejecting the claim that state courts may
decline to enforce federal penal statutes); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122-23
(1825); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 89 (1969); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 437-38.
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the current inquiry, however. The maxim contemplates a case tried
by a traditional court of general jurisdiction applying domestic law,
rather than a case involving two sovereigns that have decided as a
matter of foreign policy that it is to their mutual advantage to
have one nation establish a mechanism to resolve a conflict that is
politically difficult for the other nation to handle. Not surprisingly,
few situations exist in which two sovereigns have made such a deci-
sion. The convocation of the United States Court for Berlin in
1978 may be the only case in recent times that can be said to pre-
sent such a situation.
Because courts have shied away from reviewing action involved
in the execution of foreign policy, stating that "resolution of such
issues frequently turn[s] on standards that defy judicial applica-
tion, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably commit-
ted to the executive or legislature, 2 43 precedent concerning the ex-
ercise of foreign judicial power is unavailing. Nonetheless, the long
tradition of deference to the executive branch in diplomatic mat-
ters indicates that article III courts will hesitate before ruling that
the President cannot respond to an ally's request by convening an
American court overseas to exercise the judicial power of another
country. The maxim forbidding one sovereign to exercise the judi-
cial power of another would therefore probably not preclude a
President's attempt to help an ally by establishing a mechanism,
administered by American diplomatic personnel, in that ally's
country to resolve a dispute the ally did not wish to assign to its
own courts.
The second premise, that determining whether an American
court overseas is exercising foreign or American judicial power is
possible, proves more problematic. Because article III forbids crim-
inal trials in American diplomatic courts overseas when these
courts attempt to exercise the judicial power of the United
States,244 determining whether an American tribunal is exercising
American judicial power or the judicial power of another nation
becomes crucial. A look at the Tiede trial in the United States
Court for Berlin illustrates the difficulties of making this determi-
nation. In 1979 the American court in Berlin applied the German
243. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 227-39.
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Penal Code. The defendant was not charged with any violations of
the criminal laws of the United States. Both prosecution and de-
fense teams included Germans as well as Americans. German citi-
zens sitting as jurors decided the case. 45
On the other hand, the American prosecutors totally controlled
the prosecution, and American lawyers dominated the defense.2 46
The judge presiding over the trial was an American, and he applied
the constitutional law of the United States in deciding questions
fundamental to the proceedings. 47 In addition, the court followed
American procedural law.248 Moreover, the trial took place in
American buildings guarded by American soldiers on an American
air base. The United States could have, on its own, enforced the
American court's judgment against Tiede. If Tiede had been found
guilty of hijacking and sentenced to years in prison by Stern, and
the West German government, faced with a public outcry, had de-
cided to release Tiede and expunge his conviction, the United
States could have ignored the West German government's decision
and confined Tiede to prison.
The United States had the power to take such an extraordinary
step and ignore the West German government because of the un-
usual legal status of West Berlin. As the occupying force in West
Berlin, the United States, not West Germany, has the supreme au-
thority over incidents that occur in the United States sector of
West Berlin. That the United States has the ultimate power in the
American sector of West Berlin was illustrated by an incident that
occurred during the criminal proceedings in 1979. Shortly before
the trial began, Stern granted a motion to suppress the statements
given by co-defendant Ruske. This ruling forced the United States
to dismiss the charges against Ruske. American officials stated that
the United States would "not cooperate in any prosecution by any-
one else . . . [and would] use [its] occupation authority in Berlin,
245. See generally United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 228-29 (1979); Stern, supra note
14, at 31-32.
246. The four American defense attorneys conducted most of the direct examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, and argued most motions. See generally Stern, supra note
14.
247. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 228.
248. Id. at 229.
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over the local German courts, to forbid any German court to prose-
cute [Ruske] ."249
In light of the extent of American participation and control, it is
unconvincing to assert that the 1979 hijacking trial in Berlin was
an exercise of German judicial power. While the proceedings were
a hybrid German-American effort, the American court ultimately
exercised the power of the United States. Accordingly, the consti-
tutional demand that the judicial power of the United States be
vested in an article III court applied. If the Americans wanted to
try Tiede-whether out of a desire to please their ally or a desire
to "look tough" on hijacking-they should have done so in an arti-
cle III court.
Because of West Berlin's unique status, the United States Court
for Berlin is not a paradigm for American diplomatic courts over-
seas. If the prosecution of Tiede had occurred in an American
court anywhere else in Germany or in any other country, it might
have been much more difficult to determine which country's judi-
cial power was actually exercised. Nonetheless, article III's com-
mand that the judicial power of the United States be vested in an
independent judiciary demands that this determination be made.
The following factors may help in determining the source of the
judicial power exercised by a diplomatic court: the extent, if any,
of the legal authority the United States exercises in the territory
where the American court is convened; the ability of the United
States to enforce the judgment of the American court; and the gen-
uineness of the delegation of foreign judicial power to the Ameri-
can court.
1. Legal Authority of United States Forces Overseas
Suppose that Tiede had diverted the Polish plane to the United
States Air Base in Frankfurt am Main and that the American Am-
bassador to West Germany, in response to a West German request
that the United States handle the prosecution, had set up an
American court in Frankfurt to try the case. Suppose further that
Tiede was charged with violating the German Penal Code and
prosecuted by a joint team of German and American prosecutors.
249. Stern, supra note 14, at 220. The prosecution also promised that "[h]aving been
prosecuted, [Ruske] will not now be extradited." Id.
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Although this hypothetical resembles the real case, one could argue
more persuasively that this court exercised German judicial power
than that the American court in Berlin did. In the Frankfurt hypo-
thetical the United States would have no legal basis for insisting
on enforcement of the American tribunal's decision, if the
Germans decided to ignore the results of the prosecution. In
Frankfurt the United States has no occupation authority over Ger-
man territory.2 50 Accordingly, if the German government con-
cluded that its delegation of judicial power had been unwise and
decided to rescind the delegation, it could do so even after convic-
tion or acquittal. Because the German government has the ulti-
mate legal authority to enforce or vacate the judgment rendered by
the American court in the hypothetical, one can argue that the ju-
dicial power at stake is German. Exercising German judicial power
does not implicate article III. Arguably, therefore, the Constitution
would not bar the President, in the exercise of his foreign relations
power, from assigning this hypothetical case to a non-article III
American tribunal.
This analysis, although facile, has troubling implications. It
would permit the United States, by treaty, to set up American ex-
ecutive branch courts in foreign countries around the world. These
courts, staffed by judges who owe their positions to the President
and are not protected by life tenure, could conduct serious crimi-
nal trials. In most instances the host country would possess the
supreme legal power and thus would have the ultimate legal au-
thority to decide whether to enforce or vacate the American court's
judgment. Accordingly, the President could assert that, because
the United States lacks the ultimate legal authority, the American
courts are exercising foreign judicial power. 25 1 American diplomatic
courts could circle the globe.
250. The United States military forces in the Federal Republic of Germany are there pur-
suant to an arrangement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated under the North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241; T.I.A.S. No. 1964;
34 U.N.T.S. 243.
251. Under this analysis, which relies on the President's foreign relations power, the Pres-
ident could convene diplomatic courts in any situation that might potentially involve some
aspect of American foreign relations.
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2. The Power of the United States to Enforce Judgments
The realities of United States power overseas belie this reliance
on legal formalities. Although a country may have legal authority
over an individual charged with a crime within its borders, in real-
ity once the accused is in United States custody he is under the
power of the United States. If he is on an American installation
overseas, the United States can easily enforce the American court's
judgment-and thwart the host country's decision to ignore the
judgment-by bringing the defendant to the United States to serve
his sentence or to go free. Thus, by and large, the United States
will have the ability to enforce the judgments of American courts
overseas.
When the American government not only convenes the court,
but also has the power to enforce the results of the American court
proceeding, concluding that the court is exercising the judicial
power of the United States becomes almost irresistible. Ignoring
the power to enforce the judgments entered by the American court,
and instead focusing only on the legal authority of the host coun-
try, elevates form over substance and is unwarranted in interpret-
ing the Constitution of the United States.5
3. Coerced Delegation of Judicial Power
Furthermore, even if one ignores the power that the United
States can exert once it has physical custody of the defendant,
other questions arise if American diplomatic courts convene over-
seas on the premise that they exercise foreign judicial power. De-
252. The significance of the ultimate power to enforce the judgment entered by the Amer-
ican tribunal can be seen by contemplating an article II "foreign policy" court within the
borders of the United States. Even if an ally officially requested the United States to con-
vene a court to try a serious criminal case, explicitly delegated its judicial power to the
United States for that trial, and made clear that it retained the final decision about enforc-
ing the court's judgment-thus taking all steps possible to demonstrate that the ally's judi-
cial power is at stake-this scheme could not be squared with article III. Once the American
court trying the "Mexican" gun-running case was convened in Texas, see supra note 240, or
the American court trying the "Philippine" murder case against the Aquino assailants was
convened in Washington, D.C., id., it would be utterly clear that the United States had the
power to enforce the judgment of the court. No matter how important the underlying Amer-
ican foreign policy concerns, allowing criminal charges against civilians in peacetime to be
adjudicated in the United States by a tribunal staffed by judges who serve at the pleasure of
the President would violate article III.
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termining whether the host country truly delegated its judicial au-
thority to the American court or whether the United States
pressured that country into letting the United States adjudicate
the matter would prove extremely difficult, for example. If the
American government wants to try civilians overseas, it has an ar-
senal of subtle and not-so-subtle pressures that it can exert to con-
vince another country that it should "delegate" its judicial power
to an American court. The executive branch could thus cajole de-
pendent foreign governments into arresting individuals selected by
American authorities, accusing these individuals of violating the
foreign government's law, and then "delegating" foreign judicial
power to the United States to try the individuals.2 53 American ex-
ecutive branch tribunals, staffed by judges dependent on the Presi-
dent for their jobs and salaries, could then adjudicate cases against
the individuals selected for prosecution by the executive branch.
Even if this cynical scenario is unlikely actually to occur, courts
should apply article III in such a manner that the scenario be-
comes impossible. Removing politically sensitive cases from the in-
dependent judicial branch and assigning them to tribunals estab-
lished by one of the political branches creates the appearance of
kangaroo courts and casts doubt on the impartiality of American
adjudication. Determining whether diplomatic pressures led to a
sham delegation would prove extremely difficult. As trials by these
overseas American tribunals would be constitutionally permissible
only if another sovereign genuinely delegated its judicial power,
subsequent habeas corpus petitions would undoubtedly challenge
the genuineness of the delegation. Because individuals convicted
by American courts have the right to contest the constitutionality
of the court's exercise of jurisdiction over them,254 defendants
253. Some exceptional circumstances may arise in which the possibility of coercion by the
United States against the host country is so unlikely, and the power of the United States to
remove the defendant from the country over its government's objections so limited, that one
could say with assurance that the judicial power of the United States was not involved. For
example, the Soviet Union theoretically could ask the United States to convene an executive
branch court in Moscow. In such circumstances, when the American court is clearly exercis-
ing foreign judicial power, the criminal trial of a civilian in an article II court might pass
constitutional muster.
254. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Historically, a writ of habeas corpus was granted when the petitioner could demonstrate
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would attempt to show that, because the tribunal that convicted
them had in reality exercised American rather than foreign judicial
power, the tribunal violated article III. Article III courts faced with
these habeas suits would then be forced to evaluate whether the
host country had voluntarily delegated its judicial power or had
been pressured by the Americans to let the Americans try the case.
The difficult and sensitive nature of such an evaluation is obvi-
ous. Defendants would argue that American diplomats instrumen-
tal in convening the diplomatic court must appear in the habeas
hearing to face questioning about their dealings with their counter-
parts and about American pressure on the host country to "dele-
gate" its judicial power to an American court. The government, on
the other hand, would no doubt respond to such habeas challenges
by urging the court not to interfere with executive decisions on for-
eign policy matters. The habeas court would thus need to under-
take difficult factual evaluations that implicate delicate matters of
international relations or refuse to examine constitutional chal-
lenges to the defendant's criminal conviction. Rather than force
the judiciary to make a choice between two such undesirable op-
tions, executive branch courts should not adjudicate criminal trials
of civilians overseas.
D. An American Court in Beirut
Contemplating the creation of a United States Court in Beirut
highlights the problems involved in determining whether an Amer-
ican court overseas is exercising foreign judicial power. Suppose
Lebanese government officials arrested a number of individuals in-
volved in the June 1985 hijacking of the TWA jet and delivered
them to United States custody. Suppose further that the govern-
ment of the United States announced that it would convene an
American court in Beirut to try the hijackers and would assign the
United States Ambassador to Lebanon to preside as judge. Ameri-
that the court in which he had been convicted had lacked jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202, 209 (1830) (refusing petition for writ because of the
sufficiency of the trial court's jurisdiction). For a discussion of the gradual expansion of the
grounds for habeas corpus relief, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-78 (1976). See gen-
erally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 330-46 (4th ed. 1983) (general discussion of
writ of habeas corpus).
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can procedural law would govern the trial. The prosecution team,
composed of American and Lebanese lawyers, would prosecute the
defendants under the criminal law of Lebanon, and each defendant
would be afforded Lebanese and American defense counsel.
Defense lawyers would undoubtedly immediately challenge the
power of an article II American court to adjudicate the serious
criminal charges lodged against the defendants. In responding that
the American tribunal could adjudicate the case because the court
was not exercising American judicial power, the prosecutors could
point to three factors. First, the court will apply Lebanese rather
than American penal law. Second, the government of Lebanon, as
sovereign over the territory containing Beirut, has the ultimate le-
gal authority to decide whether to enforce the judgment of the
American tribunal. Finally, the creation of an American tribunal to
exercise the judicial power delegated by the Lebanese government
is a legitimate exercise of American foreign policy that the judicial
branch should not disturb.
None of these factors, however, is persuasive. First, whatever
substantive law the court applies, adjudication takes place in an
American federal court: the American federal government created
the court, the court will follow American procedures, an American
judge appointed by the President will preside, and Americans will
serve as the chief lawyers. In light of these facts, asserting that this
court is a Lebanese court is comparable to asserting that a state
court located in New York is an Illinois court when it applies the
substantive law of Illinois.
Second, although the United States has claimed no sovereignty
over Lebanon, once the defendants are present in the American
court in Beirut the United States has the power to enforce the
court's judgment against them. The courtroom presence of the
American military guards who provide security for the court, cou-
pled with the offshore American military presence, ensures Ameri-
can physical power over the defendants.
Third, determining that Lebanon voluntarily delegated Lebanese
judicial power to the American court would prove difficult. Indeed,
one cannot even say with certainty that the civilian government of
Lebanon actually governs Beirut, much less Lebanon. Although the
government may technically embody the sovereignty of Lebanon,
in reality other countries and their proxy forces control much of
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Lebanon.2 5 5 With so little control, so much chaos, and so many en-
emies, the Lebanese government can hardly ignore diplomatic and
military pressure exerted by the United States.
Moreover, when examined in light of the policies underlying ar-
ticle III, a trial in an executive branch tribunal in these circum-
stances becomes particularly troubling. The United States has a
great incentive to exert political pressure because it has a signifi-
cant interest in the trial and conviction of those who hijacked an
American airplane, murdered an American serviceman, assaulted
Americans aboard the plane, and held other Americans hostage for
two weeks. Not only does the United States wish to see the hijack-
ers punished for these specific offenses, but the United States also
wants to deter future hijackings of American airliners. Because the
weak position of the Lebanon government suggests that a Leba-
nese trial may never even begin, American authorities might have
decided that convening an American forum was the only way to
ensure a trial. If so, the possibility would be great that American
political pressure led to this "delegation" of Lebanese judicial
power to an American court. The United States therefore might
have convened the American court in Beirut because it wanted to
ensure that an American court would try the hijackers rather than
because the United States merely wanted to do a disinterested
favor for an ally. Whatever the facts, one could not say with cer-
tainty that the American court in Beirut exercised the judicial
power of Lebanon rather than that of the United States.
If an American court were convened in Beirut on the articulated
rationale that it would exercise Lebanese judicial power, the de-
fendants were convicted, and the defendants subsequently filed
habeas corpus petitions, the reviewing court would face a mass of
difficult issues. The defendants would no doubt assert that the del-
egation of Lebanese judicial power had been a sham and that their
convictions were invalid because they had not been tried in an arti-
cle III court. In order to prove their contention, they might seek
the testimony of diplomats from the United States, Lebanon,
Syria, and Israel, military commanders leading the American,
Druse, and Amal forces in Lebanon, and spokesmen for other po-
litical and religious groups in the Middle East. American courts
255. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1985, § 1, at 10, col. 3.
1986]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
have not attempted in the past to evaluate such politically
freighted decisions, and nothing in the Beirut situation makes the
task appear any more amenable to judicial action now. Confronted
with a fundamental constitutional challenge to the legitimacy of
the criminal proceedings, faced with facts that suggest an Ameri-
can incentive to pressure its ally to allow an American trial, and
ill-equipped to determine whether the United States Court for Bei-
rut had exercised the judicial power of the United States in viola-
tion of article III, the court would be justified in granting the
habeas corpus petition and requiring the government to prosecute
the defendants in an article III court if it desired to try them
again. In light of article III's goal of protecting judges from politi-
cal pressures and the Supreme Court's hesitance to allow excep-
tions to article III, a decision to grant habeas relief would be cor-
rect. Nonetheless, it would yield an undesirable result. In order to
protect federal courts from having to examine such politically sen-
sitive situations and to prevent the duplication of judicial re-
sources that new trials would entail, the executive branch should
refrain from convening article II courts overseas to try hijackers.
E. An American Court in Italy
Although the American troops surrounding the airplane carrying
the Palestinian hijackers of the cruise ship allowed the Italian
forces on the NATO air base in Sicily to take the hijackers into
custody, a slightly different scenario is easy to imagine. If the hi-
jackers had instead been taken into American custody, the United
States would have faced three options: deliver the hijackers to the
Italian government for trial, send the hijackers to the United
States for trial in an article III court, or try the hijackers in an
American court convened in Italy. The first two alternatives would,
of course, pose no constitutional problems. The third alternative,
which might prove palatable to the Italian government, would also
be constitutional so long as the court were established under arti-
cle III. An attempt by the President to convene an American exec-
utive branch tribunal in Italy and to justify this court as a mecha-
nism for the exercise of Italian judicial power would violate the
Constitution, however. The trial of a notorious and politicized
crime in a civilian setting is the very situation in which the judicial
independence required by article III is most necessary. As the
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Marathon opinion emphasized, "[a]ll criminal matters with the
narrow exception of military crimes. . .[are] at the protected core
of [the judicial] power. . . assigned. . to an independent Article
III branch. ' 256 At the least, therefore, claims that an American
trial can proceed without the safeguards of an article III court
should be viewed with skepticism.
Nonetheless, one might argue that a trial in an American court
in Italy is actually an exercise of Italian rather than American judi-
cial power and, as such, falls outside the bounds of article III. Em-
phasizing the following factors might bolster this contention: the
American court was convened in response to a request by the Ital-
ian government, sovereign in Italy; the court would apply Italian
penal law; Italian and American lawyers would serve on both the
prosecution and defense teams. While these facts distinguish this
court from the typical American federal court, they do not make a
persuasive case that the court is exercising Italian judicial power.
As in the Beirut hypothetical previously discussed,5 the Italian
government in this case may have the ultimate legal authority to
carry out or overturn the American court's decision, but the
United States in all likelihood has the ultimate power to enforce
the court's judgment. The specter of a coerced delegation of judi-
cial power also looms. Although more stable than the government
of Lebanon, the Italian government is a shaky coalition. As recent
events have shown, disregarding requests by the United States can
bring down the government of Italy. 58 The United States also has
other diplomatic pressures at its disposal, raising questions about
which judicial power the American tribunal in fact will exercise. In
light of the presumption against permitting federal adjudication
outside article III, the policy reasons that trigger the need for judi-
cial independence-and its appearance-in highly politicized crim-
inal trials, and the metaphysical investigation that a subsequent
habeas corpus petition would require if American courts were au-
thorized to evade the requirements of article Ill on the rationale
that they exercised foreign judicial power, an American diplomatic
256. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.25
(1982) (plurality opinion).
257. See supra text accompanying note 255.
258. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
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court should not be convened in Italy to try the hijackers of the
Italian cruise ship.
VI. CONCLUSION
Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of the
United States to an independent branch staffed by judges whose
judicial independence is safeguarded by life tenure and protection
against salary reductions. Although exceptions exist that permit
military courts, territorial courts, and courts assigned public rights
cases to adjudicate certain federal matters despite these courts'
lack of article III safeguards, these exceptions must be construed
narrowly. If American courts are convened overseas to try civilians
accused of hijacking-or any other non-military crimes-the courts
must be established under article III. Neither the President's war
power nor his power to conduct foreign relations is so extensive as
to allow him to ignore the requirements of article III.
The existence of the United States Court for Berlin, an article II
tribunal, highlights the threat to article III raised by American tri-
als of civilians for crimes committed overseas. Indeed, the threat
materialized in Tiede's hijacking trial in the United States Court
for Berlin. Tiede did not raise an article III challenge to his trial
by an executive branch court, however, and no court .reviewed the
constitutionality of his conviction.2 9 Nonetheless, from an article
III perspective the 1979 hijacking trial in Berlin provides a classic
example of the need for judicial independence in American courts
overseas. American executive branch officials in Berlin were sensi-
259. Tiede filed no subsequent attack on his trial conviction. Indeed, he had little incen-
tive either to appeal or to file a habeas corpus petition. Stern sentenced Tiede to time
served, so at the end of the trial Tiede walked out of the courtroom a free man. Although he
had been convicted of a crime and had the right to appeal, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY, Law No. 46, Apr. 28, 1955, art. 5, reprinted in United
States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 237 (1979) (providing that any defendant can petition the
Chief of Mission to review his conviction), a defendant in Tiede's position would be reluc-
tant to attempt to overturn his conviction. If Tiede had succeeded in reversing the trial
results, he might well have faced another trial with the risk of another conviction and a
more severe sentence. Furthermore, if on appeal it had been decided that the United States
Court for Berlin lacked jurisdiction over Tiede's hijacking trial, Tiede would probably have
been forced to defend himself against criminal charges in a German court, with no jury and
no prior cases in which German courts had recognized the necessity to escape as a defense to
otherwise criminal activity. See Stern, supra note 14, at 58.
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tive to the diplomatic repercussions of the case. The Soviets, Poles,
and East Germans clearly wanted a conviction, while the Ameri-
cans, pressured by an ally to handle the case, wanted to uphold the
air piracy treaties so that other countries would in the future pun-
ish hijackers of American planes. In this politicized situation, the
executive branch appointed both the prosecutors and the judge. 260
The very threat that article III aims to prevent-the control of a
federal court by the executive branch-was palpably present.
Neither the war power nor the foreign relations power of the
President justified trying Tiede for hijacking in an article II court.
His trial in the United States Court for Berlin was unconstitu-
tional. Convening executive branch courts to try similar hijacking
cases involving American citizens in Beirut or Italy or elsewhere
beyond the territory of the United States would also violate article
III. To prevent unconstitutional trials overseas in the future, only
courts established under article III should try hijacking cases.
260. Judge Stern was appointed to the United States Court for Berlin by the President's
delegate, the United States Ambassador to West Germany. He was fired by the same man.
Stern was also an article I judge appointed to the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey. Whether this coincidence might have saved the United States Court
for Berlin from an unconstitutional exercise of power in the Tiede case is an interesting
question. Although guaranteed life tenure by his prior appointment to the federal court in
New Jersey, and therefore not totally dependent on his Berlin appointment for his liveli-
hood, Stern was dependent on the good will of the executive branch to continue on in his
special position as the only American judge in Berlin. While Stern himself may not have
valued that particular position highly or may have been glad to limit his future European
travel to vacation trips, one can easily hypothesize a situation in which the extra emolu-
ments or prestige would be important to an individual. In such a situation a judge might
well find pressure from the executive branch hard to resist. The policies animating the judi-
cial independence requirements of article III would have been much less at risk if the judge
presiding over Tiede's criminal trial had not been subject to any potential punishment by
the President, including dismissal from a temporary position.
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